Archive for the 'Palestine/Israel' Category

Moral equivalency

June 18 2009

Meet the Press, NBC, June 14, six months after Gaza.

David Gregory: Is there moral equivalency in the fight between Israelis and Palestininans in your view?

Joe Biden: No, no, there’s not moral equivalency.

Gregory: Did the President suggest there was in his [Cairo] speech?

Biden: I don’t believe the President did suggest that.

South Africa before the Portuguese

June 12 2009

The so-called Bushman culture of hunter-gatherers formed between perhaps 40,000 and 25,000 years ago. The Bushmen have lighter skins than most Africans.

Beginning c 500 BC, some Bushman groups acquired livestock from further north. Hunting and gathering gave way to herding cattle and oxen. The arrival of livestock introduced concepts of personal wealth and property-ownership into Bushman society.

The pastoralist Bushmen became known as Khoikhoi (“men of men”). The still hunter-gatherer Bushmen became known as San. Hunting and gathering had all but died out by 2000.

The two groups intermarried, and the term Khoisan arose. Over time the Khoikhoi established themselves along the coast, while small groups of San continued to inhabit the interior.

Soon afterwards Bantu peoples – a linguistic, not racial definition – reached South Africa. Nearly all the languages of sub-Saharan Africa today belong to the Niger-Congo family. The Khoisan languages are the main exception. Niger-Congo A languages cover West Africa. Niger-Congo B are the Bantu languages. The Bantu migrations originated near the Niger delta in southern Nigeria, near the border with Cameroon.

The Bantu-speakers had an advanced Iron Age culture, keeping domestic animals and practising agriculture, farming sorghum and other crops. They lived in small settled villages. The Bantu-speakers arrived in small waves rather than in one large migration.

There were various Bantu lingustic subgroups in southern Africa: Venda, Lemba and Shangaan-Tsonga (the Lemba speak Bantu languages, but have racial and cultural connections with the Jews); Nguni (Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi, Ndebele; the British wrote Ndebele as Matabele); Sotho-Tswana (Tswana, Pedi, Basotho).

The more I look into this, the more I realise the richness and complexity of the picture, the folly of dividing anthropology from history, and the idiocy of Hugh Trevor-Roper’s “Perhaps in the future there will be some African history to teach. But at present there is none: there is only the history of Europeans in Africa.” Trevor-Roper mocked Toynbee, who may have known little of African history, but was ready in spirit to know more. (He did write a small book about Africa.)

The Bushmen of southern Africa and the Bantu-speakers lived mostly peacefully together. Neither had any method of writing. Archaeologists have found numerous Khoisan artefacts at the sites of Bantu settlements.

Several Southern Bantu languages (notably Xhosa and Zulu) incorporated many click consonants of earlier Khoisan languages. The coastal inhabitants of southern Africa sold gold and ivory to Muslims, who sailed the Indian Ocean as far south as Mozambique. There were indirect trade links with China: porcelain reached Africa.

Khoisan 1Khoisan 2

The Arabian Passion

April 10 2009

arabian-passion

The image is a link. More at On an Overgrown Path.

My last Good Friday post contained two images from the Middle East. Why was my explanation, in a Comment, of where I had found them so elaborate? Because many war photographs are fakes. I am tempted to say that all war photographs should be looked at sceptically, but that would give too much room to the conspiracy theorists. The Middle East has enough of them already.

Wells’s Outline – A thronging, amazing Paris

March 26 2009

“In 1919, Paris was the capital of the world.” Margaret MacMillan’s Peacemakers, The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, John Murray, 2001.

Below, HG Wells’s Outline of History on Paris in 1919.

Wells, as an older contemporary of Toynbee, wanders into this blog occasionally. But why was the Outline, large parts of which were, as he admitted, cobbled together from the Encyclopædia Britannica, taken so seriously in its time?

It was published as a serial in soft covers in 1919, with colour plates and black-and-white photographs, and drawings and maps by JF Horrabin. The first hard cover book edition appeared in two volumes in 1920, reproducing or imitating the large-page format. The book one sees more often, which endured, was a monochrome single-volume blockbuster with no photographs, but with Horrabin’s drawings and maps.

Wells revised and updated the book more than once. After his death, Raymond Postgate and HG’s son GP Wells took the story up to 1963. The last print edition was in 1971.

What value does the Outline have now? None really, though some passages, including those on Versailles, are vintage Wells (I have quoted another on Versailles here). It’s an otherwise intellectually unsatisfying work, a thousand times superseded. Some saw its limitations at the time, but nearly all agreed that it was a wonderful achievement.

Wells had prestige. There was a hunger for a “synoptic view of world affairs” after the war. But, as I have suggested, it impressed partly because the idea of a world history, strange as this now sounds, was new. There had been ancient and medieval precedents, and a few recent multi-volume syndicated encyclopædic efforts (such as The Historians’ History of the World) in a format which the original, serialised Outline itself partly followed, but nothing by a serious modern figure, pace Ranke and Burckhardt.

Soon, there were imitators. Hendrik Willem van Loon’s The Story of Mankind was particularly popular, not only with children. Spengler’s Decline of the West, very different, had appeared in Germany in 1918.

Edward Shanks’s review of the Outline in The London Mercury is reprinted in Patrick Parrinder, editor, HG Wells, The Critical Heritage, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.

Forster wrote at least three critical articles about it (they are reprinted in The Prince’s Tale and Other Uncollected Writings, André Deutsch, 1998).

Catholics objected. Chesterton wrote a book, The Everlasting Man, to refute its world view. “I do not believe that the past is most truly pictured as a thing in which humanity merely fades away into nature, or civilization merely fades away into barbarism, or religion fades away into mythology, or our own religion fades away into the religions of the world. In short, I do not believe that the best way to produce an outline of history is to rub out the lines.”

Belloc wrote A Companion to Mr Wells’s “Outline of History”. Wells replied with Mr Belloc Objects. Belloc replied with Mr Belloc Still Objects.

Toynbee referred to it in the Study.

Nehru’s Glimpses of World History (I mentioned it here) was a kind of Asian riposte to it. This is an enchanting book, even though, or because, written for a child, his daughter Indira (Gandhi). Somebody offered it in a Sunday newspaper list recently as among the unjustly forgotten books. I’ll second that. I’d rather have it on a desert island than the Wells. Its maps were done by Wells’s illustrator, JF Horrabin.

Virginia Woolf referred to the Wells in Between the Acts.

There was more.

___

Wells on Versailles and Paris in 1919, mainly relying on a quotation:

“As the heads of the principal Governments implicitly claimed to be the authorized spokesmen of the human race, and endowed with unlimited powers, it is worth noting that this claim was boldly challenged by the people’s organs in the Press. Nearly all the journals read by the masses objected from the first to the dictatorship of the group of Premiers, Mr. Wilson being excepted. … [Footnote: Dillon. And see his The Peace Conference, chapter iii, for instances of the amazing ignorance of various delegates.]

“The restriction upon our space in this Outline will not allow us to tell here how the Peace Conference shrank from a Council of Ten to a Council of Four (Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando), and how it became a conference less and less like a frank and open discussion of the future of mankind, and more and more like some old-fashioned diplomatic conspiracy. Great and wonderful had been the hopes that had gathered to Paris. ‘The Paris of the Conference,’ says Dr. Dillon, ‘ceased to be the capital of France. It became a vast cosmopolitan caravanserai teeming with unwonted aspects of life and turmoil, filled with curious samples of the races, tribes, and tongues of four continents who came to watch and wait for the mysterious to-morrow.

‘An Arabian Nights’ touch was imparted to the dissolving panorama by strange visitants from Tartary and Kurdistan, Korea and Aderbeijan (sic), Armenia, Persia, and the Hedjaz – men with patriarchal beards and scimitar-shaped noses, and others from desert and oasis, from Samarkand and Bokhara. Turbans and fezes, sugar-loaf hats and head-gear resembling episcopal mitres, old military uniforms devised for the embryonic armies of new states on the eve of perpetual peace, snowywhite burnouses, flowing mantles, and graceful garments like the Roman toga, contributed to create an atmosphere of dreamy unreality in the city where the grimmest of realities were being faced and coped with.

‘Then came the men of wealth, of intellect, of industrial enterprise, and the seed-bearers of the ethical new ordering, members of economic committees from the United States, Britain, Italy, Poland, Russia, India, and Japan, representatives of naphtha industries and far-off coal mines, pilgrims, fanatics and charlatans from all climes, priests of all religions, preachers of every doctrine, who mingled with princes, field-marshals, statesmen, anarchists, builders-up and pullers-down. All of them burned with desire to be near to the crucible in which the political and social systems of the world were to be melted and recast. Every day, in my walks, in my apartment, or at restaurants, I met emissaries from lands and peoples whose very names had seldom been heard of before in the West. A delegation from the Pont-Euxine Greeks called on me, and discoursed of their ancient cities of Trebizond, Samsoun, Tripoli, Kerassund, in which I resided many years ago, and informed me that they, too, desired to become welded into an independent Greek Republic, and had come to have their claims allowed. The Albanians were represented by my old friend Turkhan Pasha, on the one hand, and by my friend Essad Pasha on the other – the former desirous of Italy’s protection, the latter demanding complete independence. Chinamen, Japanese, Koreans, Hindus, Kirghizes, Lesghiens, Circassians, Mingrelians, Buryats, Malays, and Negroes and Negroids from Africa and America were among the tribes and tongues foregathered in Paris to watch the rebuilding of the political world system and to see where they “came in.” …’

“To this thronging, amazing Paris, agape for a new world, came President Wilson, and found its gathering forces dominated by a personality narrower, in every way more limited and beyond comparison more forcible than himself: the French Premier, M. Clemenceau. At, the instance of President Wilson, M. Clemenceau was elected President of the Conference. ‘It was,’ said President Wilson, ‘a special tribute to the sufferings and sacrifices of France.’ And that, unhappily, sounded the keynote of the Conference, whose sole business should have been with the future of mankind.”

___

The “Council of Ten” contained the heads of government and foreign ministers of Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan.

The months of the conference were those of the Spartacist uprising in Berlin, of the foundation of the Fascist party in Italy, of the Bavarian and Hungarian Socialist Republics, of the Amritsar massacre in India, of convulsions in Ireland, Egypt, eastern Europe and Russia, Turkey, Korea and China.

Arrival of jazz in France. In painting and a vein of “classical” music, the eve of a return to form and order.

Paris would remain the centre of the Western art world for another twenty years. Then its decline would be as steep as that of Vienna’s in music.

Parisian throngs not embroiled in war or revolution: La comédie humaineLes enfants du paradisLa bohème, Act II … Louise, Act II …

Versailles 1919 (post here)

orpen_001f

William Orpen, The Signing of Peace in the Hall of Mirrors, Versailles, London, Imperial War Museum

Lloyd George in Versailles

March 25 2009

One day I had to hand some papers to Lloyd George after the close of some meeting on Middle Eastern affairs. I had frequently seen Lloyd George and heard him speak, but this was the only occasion on which I had ever met him, and this encounter of mine with him had lasted for no longer than a minute or two; but it had been unexpectedly revealing; for, when he had taken the papers and started to scan them, Lloyd George, to my delight, had forgotten my presence and had begun to think aloud. “Mesopotamia … yes … oil … irrigation … we must have Mesopotamia; Palestine … yes … the Holy Land … Zionism … we must have Palestine; Syria … h’m … what is there in Syria? Let the French have that.”

Lloyd George was probably showing off to the young aide. His remarks were as insolent as Churchill’s in 1936 to the House of Commons: “The Emir Abdullah is in Transjordania, where I put him one Sunday afternoon in Jerusalem.” That was in 1921.

What would a post-Ottoman middle eastern settlement have been if there had been no mandates?

A critic of Toynbee’s style might ask: “Did the whole of that second sentence need to be in the pluperfect tense?”

Acquaintances, OUP, 1967

and reported by Margaret MacMillan in Peacemakers, The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, John Murray, 2001

Gaza, gender, Galileo

January 24 2009

My heart sank on Christmas Day when I read the BBC headline “Pope appeals for Mid-East peace”. Why didn’t he appeal for mid-east justice?

Last year Daniel Barenboim, citizen of Argentina, Spain and Israel, who had co-founded the West-Eastern Divan orchestra with Edward Said in 1999, caused a minor scandal in Israel by accepting honorary Palestinian citizenship. On January 1 he said to a worldwide audience at the end of the New Year Concert of the Vienna Philharmonic, before the toast: “We hope the year 2009 will be a year of peace in the world and of human justice in the Middle East.”

The Pope had made his appeal two days after offending Vladimir Luxuria by declaring that “mankind needed to be saved from a destructive blurring of gender” (BBC).

Two days before that (December 21), he had found it necessary to praise Galileo. In 1990, as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, he had seemed to condone the charge of heresy against him. On October 31 1992, after the matter had been studied by the Pontifical Council for Culture, Pope John Paul II expressed regret for how the Galileo affair had been handled and conceded that the Earth was not stationary.

Today, Pope Benedict offended Israel by rehabilitating a bishop who had been appointed by the rebel Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre in the ’80s. The bishop had been excommunicated because his appointment had been a schismatic act, separating both him and the appointor from Rome, but what is causing the offence now is that he had allegedly said that there had been no Nazi gas chambers.

On January 8, the Pope’s justice (that word again) minister, Cardinal Martino, did a little better than the Pope had managed on Christmas Day, by likening the besieged Gaza Strip to a “big concentration camp”. The Catholic Church has tended to be sympathetic to the Palestinians.

Pius XII had been scandalously silent in the ’30s and ’40s on the fate of the Jews. Last October, Pope Benedict said that he was considering halting the process of canonising him, which he had previously supported, until more historical archives could be opened.

The feeblest surrender to the Israeli lobby on Gaza in recent days has been that of the BBC.

I went to Gaza for a day in September 1973, shortly before the Yom Kippur War. I was on holiday in Israel. Some Catholic friends in England had introduced me to two ladies who worked for the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, Miss Breen and Miss Hunnybun.

Helen Breen and Carol Hunnybun. I even remember their first names. They had to deliver some medical supplies to occupied Gaza and I drove with them. Distances in Israel are always so much less than you expect. From Jerusalem to Gaza is not even fifty miles. I am guessing now that we drove as far as Jabaliya Camp.

What happened to the Misses Breen and Hunnybun? The web has the answer, at least for Helen Breen. A Bethlehem University web page quotes a letter on the matter:

“The Pontifical Mission for Palestine (PMP) was founded in April 1949 as a temporary agency to deal with the problems of the Palestinian refugees by coordinating the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church to deal with the results of the U.N. partition of  Palestine. [Though not much of the UN plan remained in 1949!] [...] Carol [Hunnybun] [brackets in original] arrived in Jerusalem in 1966 and Helen [Breen] [ditto] followed in 1967, coming from the PMP office in Beirut. In 1964 Carol spent time in Jerusalem working with the press for the visit of Paul VI. We [PMP] [ditto] did not have an office at that time. They both retired from PMP in 1982. Both were members of the Grail working out of England. Helen died in July 1992.”

I learned that the war had broken out when, on the Mount of Olives on October 6, I heard the sirens. I walked back into Jerusalem. I was staying in a hostel offered by the Armenian Catholic church not far from the Damascus Gate in the Old City. The priest – I think his name was Michael – huddled over his radio in the kitchen that evening to try to hear the news. I drove to the airport near Tel Aviv through a blacked-out landscape a day or two afterwards.

The feeblest website of any public figure involved with the Middle East (apart, I assume, from that of Amr Moussa if he has one) must be that of Tony Blair. He has two sites, in fact: here and here.

The siege of Gaza

December 28 2008

Before I come back on January 6, Robin Yassin-Kassab on Gaza.

Arab anglophiles

December 8 2008

All over the Middle East are people, middle managers, who are almost sick with love of England, not because they know it well: they may not have been there since their youth, and certainly have never shopped in Harrods, but because of the weeks they spent with that family in Bromley or Streatham in 1977. [Comments below.]

The King’s Highway

October 22 2008

The passage below is part of a survey of imperial communications.

A footnote refers us to maps 11 (South-West Asia, Egypt, and the Aegean in the 18th cent. B.C.: Successor-States of the Third Dynasty of Ur at the Beginning of Hammurabi’s Reign at Babylon, 1792 or 1728 B.C.), 14 (The New Empire and its Neighbours after Thothmes III’s Campaign in the Thirty-third Year of his Reign, ? 1458 B.C.), 20 (The Achaemenian Empire: Communications and Taxation Districts on the Eve of Xerxes’ Invasion of Continental European Greece in 480 B.C.) and 21A (The Syrian “Roundabout”) in the eleventh volume.

This Wikimedia Commons map shows the King’s Highway c 1300 BC in red. The Via Maris is shown in purple, other routes in brown.

There was [a] famous road, “the King’s Highway”, [footnote: Num. xx. 17 and xxi. 22. See Wright, V. E., and Filson, F. V.: The Westminster Historical Atlas of the Bible (London 1946, Student Christian Movement Press), p. 40, fig. 25, for an aerial photograph of a section of this road in Transjordan.] which [...] played an historic part in the life of one empire after another. This thoroughfare ran north and south, along the border between Syria and the Syrian Desert, from the crossings of the Euphrates, at the point where the river bends nearest to the Mediterranean [the Wikimedia map has it starting south of this point], through Damascus and Transjordan to the head of the Gulf of ’Aqabah, where the road branched westwards across the Desert of Sinai towards Egypt and south-eastwards into Arabia. This King’s Highway had served successively the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, “the New Empire” of Egypt, the Neo-Babylonian Empire, and the Achaemenian Empire. After the shattering of the Achaemenian Peace by Alexander, the Ptolemies and the Seleucids, holding opposite ends of the thoroughfare, had contended with one another for possession of the whole of it, and the Seleucids had won the contest only to give place to Rome – till the King’s Highway had changed hands again from the Roman Empire to the Arab Caliphate and thereafter, in its southern sector, from the ‘Abbasids’ Fātimid successor-state to the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.

In the course of its long and chequered history the King’s Highway has been used, not only by its official masters of the moment, but by rebels, raiders, and rival Powers. The Elamite and Babylonian warlords who had twice taken this road in the eighteenth century B.C. in order to reimpose the long dormant authority of an Empire of Sumer and Akkad on the princelings of Syria had been pursued along their own highway on their return march, and been relieved of their booty, by an untamed band of Hebrew Nomads. [Footnote: See Gen. xiv. The historical events which here loom through a mist of tradition may perhaps be dated some time between the annexation of the Sumerian Empire of lsin by the Elamite State of Larsa circa 1799-1793 or 1735-1729 B.C. and the annexation of Larsa by the Amorite State of Babylon in 1762 or 1698 B.C. [...]. The account in Gen. xiv. 13-24 of Abraham’s audacious but successful surprise attack on the plunder-laden army of the retreating [Elamite] imperialists is reminiscent of the attack by the [Thracian] Brygi on an Achaemenian army marching along the coast road from the Hellespont to European Greece circa 492 B.C. (Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 45) and of the similar attack by Thracians on a Roman army following the same route in 188 B.C. (Livy, Book XXXVIII, chap. 40).] In the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C. the King’s Highway had carried a Palestinian barbarian Hyksos war-band to the north-eastern corner of Egypt, and perhaps also an advance guard of the Eurasian Nomad Mitanni to the northwestern corner of Arabia, on the last stage of their long trek from the south-western shore of the great Eurasian Steppe. In the fourteenth or thirteenth century B.C. the Children of Israel had been refused a passage along the southernmost section of the King’s Highway by the Edomite successor-state of “the New Empire” of Egypt, [footnote: Num. xx. 14-22 and xxi. 4.] and had forced a passage along another section in the teeth of opposition from an Amorite successor-state in the Peraea, [footnote: Num. xxi. 21-32.] on their way to carve out a domain for themselves on the western side of Jordan. In the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries B.C. the independent principalities of Syria that had emerged from a dark age following the collapse of “the New Empire” of Egypt and the overthrow of “the thalassocracy of Minos” had fallen victims to Assyrian aggressors following on Chedorlaomer’s track [Chedorlaomer was the Elamite whom Abraham attacked]; and when the downfall of Assyria had seemed to promise them relief they had been cheated of it by the immediate substitution of Babylonian for Assyrian rule. On the eve of the overthrow of the Neo-Babylonian Empire by Cyrus the Achaemenid, the King’s Highway had once again come to the fore in the play of international politics, and a would-be leader of an anti-Babylonian movement among the remnant of Judah had exhorted his countrymen to recondition this historic route in order to expedite the passage of Cyrus’s liberating armies.

“The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness: Prepare ye the way of the Lord; make straight in the desert a highway for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain.” [Footnote: Isa. xl. 3-4. [...]]

[...]

At the break-up of the Achaemenian Empire’s Seleucid successor-state, Nabataean intruders from Arabia, treading in the footsteps of the Children of Israel, had followed the King’s Highway, without turning off it to pass over Jordan, till they had reached and occupied Damascus; and at the break-up of the Roman Empire the Primitive Muslim Arabs – taking the same war-path, and avenging, in a decisive victory at the passage of the Yarmuk, their discomfiture at Mu’tah in their first encounter with the Roman veterans of the last and greatest Romano-Persian War – had not only captured Damascus but had established there the capital of an empire whose boundaries they had pushed out, within the next hundred years, to Farghānah on the one side and to the Atlantic coasts of Morocco and the Iberian Peninsula on the other. At the break-up of the Arab Caliphate the Crusaders, bursting into Syria through the Cilician Gates and by sea, had forced the passage of the Jordan in the reverse direction to that of the Israelites’ trek, and had pushed their way southwards, down the southernmost stretch of the King’s Highway, till they had reached the head of the Gulf of ‘Aqabah and had thereby momentarily cut the land communications between the African and Asiatic domains of Dār-al-Islām.

This history of the King’s Highway over a period of some three thousand years might look like a monotonous repetition of contests between successive universal states claiming legitimate sovereignty over the thoroughfare and outsiders disputing their title by force of arms. Yet the historic importance of the King’s Highway lay in none of these episodes. This long-fought-over thoroughfare was to find its destiny at last as an Islamic Pilgrims’ Way on which, year by year, a peaceful multitude of Muslims – converging from the far-flung outposts of Dār-al-Islām in Fez and Sarayevo and Vilna and Qāzān and Kāshghar – would make the Hajj, at first on foot or camel-back and latterly by train, [footnote: The building of the Hijāz railway southwards from Damascus along the route of the King’s Highway was begun in A.D. 1900 and was completed as far as Medina in A.D. 1908. Put out of action in the war of 1914-18, the Hijāz Railway remained derelict thereafter from Ma’ān southwards.] to the Holy Cities of the Hijāz.

I’ll post a synopsis of the history of all the ancient near-eastern empires in due course.

A Study of History, Vol VII, OUP, 1954

Gaza gets a museum

July 28 2008

PhDiva.

New York Times preview.

Wikipedia.

Gaza has usually been a stop on the trading route between Egypt and Syria.

At different times it has been under Egyptian, Phoenician, Philistine, Israelite, Chaldean, Persian, Greek, Roman, Arab, Crusader, Turkish, British rule. I’ll look at its history properly another time. (I went there in 1973.)

What Hadrian can teach Obama

July 23 2008

Martin Kettle, The Guardian, via Davos Newbies.

Archaeological Museum, Athens

The shot heard round the world 2

July 5 2008

The shot heard round the world 1

The latter part of Toynbee’s public lecture at the University of Pennsylvania in spring 1961.

In the first part he looked at the impact of America’s revolution in other countries. But how direct was its influence? How did it affect the French revolution, which would have happened anyway? The American revolution’s roots were equally in the Enlightenment.

It was an inspiration, an exemplar for overturning a régime, like the Dutch Revolt and the English revolution.

The Marquis de Lafayette helped the Americans in the war of 1775-83 and was in America from 1777 to ’82, with a break in France in 1779. He returned as a hero in 1824-5, visiting every state. The Declaration of Independence influenced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which was adopted by the National Constituent Assembly in 1789.

In the first extract, Toynbee, who was so aware of the temptations of nationalism, fails, like many nineteenth-century liberals, to distinguish carefully between nationalist and social revolutions, as if freedom from foreign oppression were itself Liberty. He speaks like an old-fashioned man of that century.

The American revolution was social first, national second. The Americans were overthrowing an oppressor, but it was their government and society that these colonies professed to be seeking to reform. What kinds of societies would the peoples who had heard the American “shot” produce?

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Once America had separated itself, it became clear that the fragment continued to oppress many of its members.

Toynbee is romantically unrealistic when he recalls the America of 1961, that “leader of a world-wide anti-revolutionary movement in defence of vested interests”, to its revolutionary traditions in its foreign policy. At one point he seems to defend revolutionary violence. He was especially provocative in implying a sympathy for Castro.

This lecture was, perhaps, a turning-point in his relationship with America, the country that had welcomed him with something like adulation in the late ’40s and the ’50s. His Study of History had seemed to have important things to say to America during its “rise to globalism”. He supported the civil rights movement, and opposed the Vietnam War in the ’60s and ’70s, and his later and bleak view of American foreign policy is reflected here in posts called Neo-colonialism: The view from 1969 and The frontier spirit.

What we are hearing now, above the echoing sound of that American shot, is the answering voice of the mass of mankind. This two-thirds – or is it three-quarters? – of the World’s population is still living only just above the starvation line and is still frequently falling below even that wretched line into death-dealing famine. Since the time when our pre-human ancestors became human, this majority of the human race has never dreamed, before today, that there would ever be any change for the better in its hard lot. Since the dawn of civilization, about 5000 years ago, the World’s peasantry has carried the load of civilization on its back without receiving any appreciable share in civilization’s benefits. These benefits have been monopolized by a tiny privileged minority, and, until yesterday, this injustice was inevitable. Till the modern industrial revolution began to get up steam, technology was not capable of producing more than a tiny surplus after meeting the requirements of bare subsistence. In our time, technology is coming within sight of being able to produce enough of civilization’s material benefits to provide for the whole human race. If technology does make it possible to get rid of the odious ancient difference in fortune between the few rich and the innumerable poor, future generations will perhaps bless the Industrial Revolution in retrospect, and will think kindly of its British, American and German pioneers.

We already have the means for making a start in improving the lot of the great depressed majority of our fellow human beings. But, in the last resort, we human beings have to do things for ourselves. The World’s peasantry cannot hope to improve its lot substantially unless it can awake from its age-old lethargy. It is being awakened at this moment by the sound of that American shot as that sound circles the globe for the third time. That sound has now been heard by the World’s whole depressed majority, and we, the affluent minority, are now hearing the majority’s reply. At last, the majority is shaking off the fatalism that has been paralysing it since the beginning of time. It is becoming alive to the truth that an improvement in its lot is now possible. More than that, it is realizing that it can do something towards this by its own efforts. Go to India; visit some of the thousands of villages there in which the Community Development Plan is already in operation; and you will see, with your own eyes, this new hope and purposefulness and energy breaking into flower. This is, to my mind, the most wonderful sight that there is to be seen in the present-day world. And this world-revolution of the peasantry is the most glorious revolution that there has been in the World’s history so far.

Well, perhaps I ought to have said “the most glorious secular revolution”; for the religious revolutions may have been more glorious; and these may also, in the long run, prove to have had still greater and more beneficent effects. By the religious revolutions I mean the advent of the World’s missionary religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and the others. The new world revolution of the peasantry perhaps cannot properly be called a religious revolution. At the same time it is unquestionably a spiritual one. It is true that the objectives that are its first aim are of a material kind. These material objectives are as elementary as they are indispensable for making a start. They are such fundamental things as a concrete lining and lip for the village well, to protect the water from being contaminated; a concrete surface for the village lanes, to redeem them from being wallows of pestilent filth; a dirt-road to link the village up with the nearest main road; and, after that, a village school. When a village reaches the stage of building a school and finding the means to provide a living for a schoolmaster, it is already beginning to raise a spiritual mansion on the preliminary material foundations. Without the foundations, the building could not go up. But the material foundations are a means to a spiritual end. And what could be more obviously spiritual than the awakening of hope and purposefulness and energy that is the driving force behind the whole of this glorious revolution? This driving force is the last and greatest of the revolutionary forces that have been released, all round the World, by the sound of a shot that was fired, on an April day, by embattled American farmers.

This exhilarating sound has not only roused the peoples of the World to action in their own homelands; it has also drawn them, like a magnet, to the land in which the shot was fired and from which the sound has gone forth. For a century, European farmers flocked to the United States in order to become American farmers, and, as the Industrial Revolution got up steam on both sides of the Atlantic, European industrial workers were soon crossing the Atlantic westward in the farmers’ wake. The tide of immigration into the United States began to flow mightily within a few years of the end of the Napoleonic Wars [when there was a severe depression in Europe]. It went on flowing till the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. And, as it flowed, it gathered volume. Before it was abruptly checked in 1914 by the action of the belligerent European governments that were concerned to conserve their cannon-fodder, the annual total of immigrants had risen to about two million in more than one year after the turn of the century.

When I think of this century of massive immigration from Europe into Europe’s American promised land, my mind focuses on my memory’s picture of an old farmer, Bavarian-born, whom I met on my first visit to this country, now nearly thirty-six years ago. His farm was in East Central Kentucky, where I was staying with a college friend of mine. At home in Bavaria, this farmer had had no farm of his own and no prospect of ever acquiring one there. It had been the hope of winning one in the New World that had lured him across the Atlantic. Though he had emigrated while he was still a young man, he had not arrived till some year in the eighteen-nineties, and by that time, of course, all the best land in the state had been taken up long ago. In Kentucky by the eighteen-nineties, settlement had been going on for more than a hundred years. All the same, this Bavarian farmer had come in time still to be a pioneer. In the western foothills of the Appalachians – “the Knobs” is their local name – he had hit upon a valley that was still unreclaimed because no predecessor of his had found it sufficiently inviting. The Bavarian had seized on that valley and had made it fruitful. To transform it had been his life-work. He had not only made it yield him enough for raising a family. By the time his sons were grown up – and there were several of them – the father had also saved enough to be able to buy for each son a better farm than the father’s own. But the old man would never buy a better farm for himself. The valley-farm had been his life-work, and, more than that, it had been his European dream translated into an American reality. As a boy in Bavaria he had dreamed of one day having a farm of his own if he could screw up his courage to pull up his roots and cross the Ocean. In this unpromising valley in Kentucky he had made his farm and his farm had made him. Nothing this side of death would part him from it.

Multiply this Bavarian-American farmer by some millions and you have a revolution inside America to match those revolutions all round the World of which I have given you a breathless catalogue. America’s revolution on her own ground and her revolutions abroad have been like each other in everything that is important in them. They have both been set going by the shot fired in April 1775; they have both been triumphs over social injustice, poverty, and hopelessness. These revolutions are true daughters of the American Revolution, and to have fathered this mighty brood is indeed an achievement to be proud of. And now come the paradox, and, I should also say, the tragedy. At the moment when the sound of that historic American shot was circling this planet for the third time, at the moment when the American revolutionary spirit had come within sight of inspiring the whole human race, America herself disowned paternity, at least for the younger and less decorous batches of her offspring.

It has been suggested recently by at least one American student of American history that America did not wait till the twentieth century to dissociate herself from the World’s response to the resounding American shot’s reverberations. The founding fathers of the United States lived to witness the French Revolution, and at least one of the most eminent of them, John Adams, put on record his repudiation and rejection of the American Revolution’s French eldest daughter after she had jilted Lafayette and had plunged into Jacobinism. I owe my knowledge of the following passage to an article by William Henry Chamberlin in The Wall Street Journal of 31 March 1961. John Adams is quoted by Mr Chamberlin as having said that “Helvetius and Rousseau preached to the French nation liberty till they made them the most mechanical slaves; equality, till they destroyed all equity; humanity, until they became weasels and African panthers; and fraternity, till they cut one another’s throats like Roman gladiators”.

This bitter verdict on the Jacobin revolution gives us some notion of how John Adams and like-minded American contemporaries of his would have reacted to the Communist revolution, if they could have lived to witness this still more violent subsequent response to the echoes of the revolution which the founding fathers themselves had launched. The founding fathers had, no doubt, carried their own revolution just as far as they had intended, and evidently some of them were unwilling to see revolution, either at home or abroad, go even one inch farther. This is indicated by the bitterness of those words of John Adams’s that I have just quoted. But his words are not only bitter; they are also ironic. They bring out the irony of the contrast between intentions and results; and this is one of the perennial ironies of human life. It is seldom indeed that the consequences of human action work out according to plan; and one might venture on the generalization that they never work out as intended when the action is of the violent kind represented by revolution and war. The more violent the initial act, the more likely it will be that its consequences will escape control. Has there ever been a revolution or a war that has produced the results, and none other than the results, that its authors intended and expected? The American revolutionaries, like their French counterparts, and unlike at least one celebrated batch of Roman gladiators [to what is he referring?], were not “too proud to fight”; and they could not fire their shot without its being heard by other ears, and without its being taken as a signal for non-American, and perhaps un-American, action. In illustrating the vanity of human wishes by the example of the Jacobins, John Adams was unconsciously passing judgement on himself as well. Fabula de te narratur is the comment that he invites in retrospect. But Adams’s anti-Jacobin invective, which thus recoils like a boomerang on Adams himself, leaves his co-founding father Jefferson unscathed. Jefferson recognized that the price of political liberty would be “turbulence”, and he was not distressed by this prospect. “I hold,” he wrote to Madison, “that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical.”

“Too proud to fight” was a phrase used by Woodrow Wilson to defend American neutrality in the First World War. It was immediately used against him.

Thus Adams’s conservatism was not shared by all the founding fathers; and Emerson was not the first American to acclaim the World Revolution and to recognize it as being the American Revolution’s offspring. America had already given a blessing to the late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century revolutions in Europe which it would be difficult for her ever to revoke, since it has been written into the map of American place-names. The names of the Corsican, Greek, Polish, and Hungarian revolutionary leaders Paoli, Ypsilandi, Kosciusko, and Kossuth have been thus immortalized. On the other hand, no Leninburg or Trotskyville has ever jumped out of the map of the United States to catch my eye. Of course there is less room for putting new names on this map nowadays than there used to be. Yet, if tomorrow a new territory of the United States were to be staked out on the face of the Moon, I do not think that any of the mushroom cities there would be likely to be called Fidel, though Fidel is really rather a beautiful name if American lips could pronounce it dispassionately.

Today America is no longer the inspirer and leader of the World Revolution, and I have an impression that she is embarrassed and annoyed when she is reminded that this was her original mission. No one else laid this mission upon America. She chose it for herself, and for one hundred and forty-two years, reckoning from the year 1775, she pursued this revolutionary mission with an enthusiasm which has proved deservedly infectious. By contrast, America is today the leader of a world-wide anti-revolutionary movement in defence of vested interests. She now stands for what Rome stood for. Rome consistently supported the rich against the poor in all foreign communities that fell under her sway; and, since the poor, so far, have always and everywhere been far more numerous than the rich, Rome’s policy made for inequality, for injustice, and for the least happiness of the greatest number. America’s decision to adopt Rome’s role has been deliberate, if I have gauged it right. It has been deliberate, yet, in the spirit that animates this recent American movement in reverse, I miss the enthusiasm and the confidence that made the old revolutionary America irresistible. Lafayette pays a high psychological price when he transforms himself into Metternich. Playing Metternich is not a happy role. It is not a hero’s role, and not a winner’s, and the player knows it. But, in those early nineteenth-century years when the real Metternich was fighting his losing battle to shore up the rickety edifice of restored “legitimacy”, who in the World would have guessed that America, of all countries, would one day cast herself for Metternich’s dreary part?

What has happened? The simplest account of it is, I suppose, that America has joined the minority. In 1775 she was in the ranks of the majority, and this is one reason why the American Revolution has evoked a world-wide response. For the non-American majority of the majority, the American revolutionary appeal has been as attractive as it was for eighteenth-century America herself. Eighteenth-century America was still appreciably poorer than the richest of the eighteenth-century West European countries: Britain, Holland, the Austrian Netherlands, France. No doubt America was, even then, already considerably richer than Asia or Africa; yet, even measured by this standard, her wealth at that time was not enormous. What has happened? While the sound of the shot fired beside the bridge at Concord has been three times circling the globe, and has each time been inciting all people outside America to redouble their revolutionary efforts, America herself has been engaged on another job than the one that she finished on her own soil in 1783. She has been winning the West and has been mastering the technique of industrial productivity. In consequence, she has become rich beyond all precedent. And, when the American sputnik’s third round raised the temperature of the World Revolution to a height that was also unprecedented, America felt herself impelled to defend the wealth that she had now gained against the mounting revolutionary forces that she herself had first called into existence.

What was the date at which America boxed the compass in steering her political course? As I see it, this date is pin-pointed by three events: the reaction in the United States to the second Russian revolution of 1917 and the two United States immigration restriction acts of 1921 and 1924.

The American reaction to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia was not, of course, peculiar to the American people. It was the same as the reaction of the rich people in all countries. Only, in the United States, it was a nation-wide reaction, because, in the United States, the well-to-do section of the population had become, by that time, a large majority, not the small minority that the rich have been and still are in most other parts of the World so far.

Rich people, not only in the United States but everywhere, have, I think, taken Communism in a very personal way. They have seen in Communism a threat to their pocket-books. So Communism, even when it has raised its head in some far-away country, has not felt to the rich like a foreign affair; the threat has seemed close and immediate, like the threat from gangsters in the streets of one’s home town. I think this explains the fact – and I am sure this is the fact – that Russian Communist aggression has got under the skins of the well-to-do in the Western World, while German nationalist aggression has not angered them to the same degree. This relative complacency towards German aggressiveness, as contrasted with the violence of the reaction to Russian aggressiveness, has made an impression on me because, I confess, it makes me bristle. I have noticed it among the rich minority in my own country, and I have noticed it still more among a wider circle of people in the United States. It is a rather startling piece of self-exposure. It is startling because, among the various dangers with which we have been threatened in our time, the danger to our personal property is not the one that we ought really to take most tragically. As a matter of fact, the well-to-do Western middle class would have been fleeced economically by the Germans, as thoroughly as this could be done by any Communists, if Germany had happened to win either the first or the second world war – and Germany came within an ace of winning each of these wars in turn. But the tragic loss that would have been inflicted on the Western World by a German victory would have been the loss of our political and our spiritual liberty. In two fearful wars that have been brought upon us by Germany within the span of a single life-time, we have saved our liberty at an immense loss in infinitely precious human lives. We have had no war with Russia in our life-time, and the Western and the Communist camp are not doomed to go to war with each other, though at present the common threat of self-annihilation in an atomic third world war hangs over us all.

Of course someone might reply to what I have just been saying by admitting the whole of my indictment of Germany but pointing out, at the same time, that Russia, too, threatens our political and spiritual freedom, besides threatening just our pockets. This is true. Yet, if I had to make the terrible choice between being conquered by a nationalist Germany and being conquered by a Communist Russia, I myself would opt for Russian Communism as against German nationalism. I would opt for it as being the less odious of the two régimes to live under. Nationalism, German or other, has no aim beyond the narrow-hearted aim of pursuing one’s own national self-interest at the expense of the rest of the human race. By contrast, Communism has in it an element of universalism. It does stand in principle for winning social justice for that great majority of mankind that has hitherto received less than its fair share of the benefits of civilization. I know very well that, in politics, principle is never more than partially translated into practice; I know that the generous-minded vein in Communism is marred by the violent and intolerant-minded vein in it. I also recognize that Communism in both Russia and China has been partly harnessed to a Russian and a Chinese nationalism that is no more estimable than German nationalism or any other nationalism is. Yet, when all this has been said, I still find myself feeling that the reaction of rich individuals and rich nations in the West to Communism since 1917 has been an “acid test”, to use President Wilson’s memorable words [the phrase is used in his Fourteen Points]. Anyway, it is, I think, indisputable that the reaction in the United States to Communism in and since the year 1917 has been a symptom of a reversal of America’s political course. It is a sign, I think, that the American people is now feeling and acting as a champion of an affluent minority’s vested interests, in dramatic contrast to America’s historic role as the revolutionary leader of the depressed majority of mankind.

The United States immigration restriction acts of 1921 and 1924 are, I believe, pointers to the same change in the American people’s attitude during and immediately after the First World War. Naturally I realize the urgent practical considerations that moved the Administration and the Congress to enact this legislation. The First World War had just brought to light a disturbing feature in this country’s domestic life: I mean, the persistence of the hyphen. [He means in phrases such as Italian-American and Irish-American.] An appreciable number of United States citizens, and of immigrants who were on their way to becoming citizens, had proved still to have divided loyalties. The American melting-pot had not yet purged out of their hearts the last residue of their hereditary attachment to their countries of origin on the European side of the Atlantic. There was evidently a long road still to travel before the process of assimilation would be completed, and this race between assimilation and immigration might never be won for Americanism unless the annual intake of immigrants were drastically reduced. Moreover, the pre-war immigrants were under criticism not only for still being pulled two ways by divided loyalties; they were also under suspicion of perhaps not being representative samples of the best European human material. The introduction of an annual quota would enable the United States Bureau of Immigration to sift the candidates for admission and to select those who promised to make the best future American citizens, and the policy of restriction was thus recommended by a eugenic motive as well as by a political one.

These considerations, by themselves, would have made some measure of restriction and selection desirable after the First World War anyway. But the main motive for the enactment of the acts of 1921 and 1924 was, I believe, a different one. Europe had just been ravaged by a war of unprecedented magnitude and severity. European belligerent governments had stopped their subjects from emigrating in order to conserve their supplies of cannon-fodder. And, now that the war was over, it was feared in the United States that the flow of immigration would start again, and this time in an unprecedented volume. A flood of penniless Europeans might pour into the United States in quest of fortunes in the New World to compensate for ruin in the Old World, and this probable rush of millions of European paupers to win a share in America’s prosperity was felt to be a menace to the economic interests of the existing inhabitants of the United States, who had a monopoly of America’s wealth at present.

If I am right in this diagnosis of the main motive for the United States immigration restriction acts of 1921 and 1924, the American people went on the defensive at this time against the impact of European immigration for the same reason that made America react so strongly against Communism. Both these reactions were those of a rich man who is concerned to defend his private property against the importunity of a mass of poorer people who are surging all round him and are loudly demanding a share in the rich man’s wealth.

What would have been the effects on America’s economic life if immigration into the United States had been left, down to this day, as free as it was during the century ending in 1921? Presumably the present population of the United States would have been much larger than it actually is, but it does not necessarily follow that the average income per head would have been lower. Experience tells us that a country’s total annual product is not a fixed amount. It may be increased by various factors. One of these stimuli to production may be a steep rise in the volume of population through a reinforcement of the natural increase by immigration. For example, the massive and unrestricted immigration into West Germany from East Germany since the end of the Second World War has been one, at least, of the causes of West Germany’s unexpected and surprising post-war economic prosperity. On this analogy it is conceivable that the economic effects of the United States immigration restriction acts of 1921 and 1924 was contrary to the legislators’ intentions and expectations. While conserving the previous income per head of the existing population of the United States, the immigration restriction acts may have prevented the income per head from rising so fast and so high as it might have done if immigration had been left unrestricted. A continuance of unrestricted immigration might also perhaps have saved the United States from the great depression of the nineteen-thirties. These are hypothetical questions which even an economist might find it hard to answer, and I am not an economist. But I would suggest to you that, whatever the economic consequences of those immigration restriction acts may have been, these economic consequences have not been the most important. The political and psychological consequences have, I should say, counted for more, and these non-economic consequences have, I should also say, been unfortunate for America as well as for Europe.

So long as immigration into the United States from Europe was unrestricted, America’s ever open door kept America in touch with the common lot of the human race. The human race, as a whole, was poor, as it still is; and America was then still a poor man’s country. She was a poor man’s country in the stimulating sense of being the country that was the poor man’s hope. She was the country, of all countries, in which a poor immigrant could look forward to improving his economic position by his own efforts. America did not, of course, even then, offer this opportunity to immigrants from the whole of the Old World. The opportunity was always restricted to immigrants from one small corner of the Old World, namely Europe. All the same, so long as America still offered herself as even just the European poor man’s hope, she retained her footing as part of the majority of the human race. In so far as she has closed her doors since 1921, she has cut herself off from the majority. This self-insulation is the inevitable penalty of finding that one has become rich and then taking steps to protect one’s new-found well-being. The impulse to protect wealth, if one has it, is one of the natural human impulses. It is not particularly sinful, but it automatically brings a penalty with it that is out of proportion to its sinfulness. This penalty is isolation. It is a fearful thing to be isolated from the majority of one’s fellow-creatures, and this will continue to be the social and moral price of wealth so long as poverty continues to be the normal condition of the World’s ordinary men and women.

I will close this first lecture in the present series by trying to drive this point home in a piece of fantasy. Let us imagine a transmigration of souls in reverse. Let us slip our own generation’s souls into the bodies of the generation of 1775, and then set the reel of history unwinding with this change in its make-up. The result that we shall obtain by this sleight of hand will be startlingly different from the actual course of events in 1775 and thereafter. The Declaration of Independence will now be made, not in Philadelphia, but at Westminster. King George III will raise his standard, not at the Court of St. James’s, but at Independence Hall (of course that building will not bear its historic revolutionary name; it will be called “Royal Hall” or “Legitimacy Hall” or some other respectable conservative name of the kind). The other George, George Washington, will take command of his royal namesake’s army. There will be no Continental Congress here in Philadelphia for George Washington to serve. The revolutionary parliament will be on the other side of the Ocean. It will be at Westminster. And the revolutionary leader will not be a George, but a Charles, namely Charles James Fox. The bridge beside which the embattled farmers will fire their shot will not be the bridge at Concord. The flood that it spans will be the Thames. The shot will be heard round the World, but it will be an Old-World shot, not a New-World one.

This nonsense that I have just been talking will have had its use if it has illustrated my thesis. I am maintaining that, since 1917, America has reversed her role in the World. She has become the arch-conservative power instead of the arch-revolutionary one. Stranger still, she has made a present of her glorious discarded role to the country which was the arch-conservative power in the nineteenth century, the country which, since 1946, has been regarded by America as being America’s Enemy Number One. America has presented her historic revolutionary role to Russia.

Is this reversal of roles America’s irrevocable choice? Is it a choice that she can afford to make? And, if she were to change her mind once again, would it now still be possible for America to rejoin her own revolution after having parted company with it forty-four years ago? I shall be taking up these questions in the second and third lectures in this series.

The second and third lectures were called The Handicap of Affluence and Can America Re-Join Her Own Revolution? The first, of which I have quoted all but the opening in these two posts, was called The Shot Heard round the World.

For the first post, I referred to the extract in EWF Tomlin, editor, Arnold Toynbee, A Selection from His Works, with an introduction by Tomlin, OUP, 1978, posthumous.

For this post, ie the remainder of the lecture, I referred to Questia’s online version of America and the World Revolution and Other Lectures, New York, OUP, 1962, which prints three sets of lectures given in different places in the New World in 1961 and ’62. The quotation from Jefferson is garbled here. I have corrected it. I have presumptively corrected one or two other mistakes: texts on Questia are not page-images and are not reliable. The Pennsylvania lectures were printed in the UK on their own as America and the World Revolution, OUP, 1962.

America and the World Revolution and Other Lectures, New York, OUP, 1962

The shot heard round the world 1

July 4 2008

In public lectures delivered at the University of Pennsylvania in spring 1961, Toynbee reminded his audience of “the revolutionary tradition which the United States had inaugurated and which she needed to re-join if she were to continue to play a positive role in the world” (EWF Tomlin).

I am just old enough to remember the time when Britain was still rich and strong enough to be the principal target for poorer and weaker peoples’ malice. Baiting is one of mankind’s oldest games, but the victim has to be a substantial one if the game is to be fun. Twisting the lion’s tail ceases to be rewarding if the lion shrinks to the size of a cat; but if a buzzard swells to the size of an eagle, it then becomes worthwhile to pull out the bird’s tail-feathers. It is not easy to adjust oneself to a rapid decrease in one’s wealth and power, but the transition is eased by one consoling form of relief. In being relieved of power and wealth, one is automatically relieved from odium. Experto crede. I am speaking from my own country’s experience in my own lifetime. We have been released from the odium that used to hang round Britain’s neck like the Ancient Mariner’s murdered albatross. The neck that is now adorned by the corpse of that albatross is America’s. When we British look at America nowadays, our feelings are mixed. We feel consoled for the recent change in our position in the world; at the same time we sympathize with you for the change in your position. I do hope that the second of these two feelings will make itself obvious to you in this present course of lectures by a British speaker. In examining America’s situation in the World today, I can say, with my hand on my heart, that my feelings are sympathetic, not malicious. After all, mere regard for self-interest, apart from any more estimable considerations, would deter America’s allies from wishing America ill. If, absit omen, America were to be worsted by her present ordeal, this would be as great a misfortune for her friends and associates as it would be for America herself.

I suppose many of us in this room have stood, more than once in our lives, on the bridge at Concord, Massachusetts, and have then crossed the bridge to read, engraved on a bronze plaque, a poem that we already knew by heart. As far as I remember, I first got to know this poem of Emerson’s through being given it, at school, to translate into Greek verse. The school was in England, not in America. The date must have been about 1905. That would be one hundred and thirty years after the day on which the historic shot had been fired by embattled American farmers. That was time enough to have made it possible for English schoolmasters and English schoolboys to look back at what had happened in April 1775 without having our vision blurred by irrelevant national sore feelings. What thrilled us, in England in 1905, at the sound of that shot, was the point that has been put inimitably by Emerson in the eight monosyllabic words of his immortal line. We forgot that the shot had been aimed at red-coats. We remembered that it had been heard round the world. That shot now meant for us, too, what it had meant for your ancestors. I myself, for instance, made my pilgrimage to the bridge at Concord the first time I visited the United States, which was in 1925.

A poet knows how to sum up in one line what it takes an historian at least several pages to recite. Within these last one hundred and eighty-six years the sound of that American shot has been travelling round and round the globe like a Russian sputnik. It had been heard in France before the eighteenth century was over. It was heard in Spanish America and in Greece while the nineteenth century was still young. In 1848, when the nineteenth century was not yet quite half spent, the sound reverberated, like a thunderclap, over the whole of Continental Europe. It was heard in Italy, and Italy arose from the dead. The Italian Risorgimento was evoked by that American shot. The sound was heard in Paris again in 1871; this time the Commune was Paris’s response to it. Travelling on eastward, the sound touched off the Russian revolution of 1905, the Persian revolution of 1906, and the Turkish revolution of 1908. By that date it had already roused the Founding Fathers of the Indian National Congress. I believe, by the way, that the original instigator of the Indian Congress Movement was an Englishman [he is thinking of Allan Octavian Hume or William Wedderburn]. If I am right about this, that Englishman launched a far bigger movement than he can have realized at the time. The Indian Congress Movement has been the mother of all the independence movements in all the Asian and African countries that, till recently, have been under the rule of West European colonial powers. But, anyway, whoever may deserve the credit for having started the Indian Congress Movement, the inspiration of it came from the sound of that American shot as this sound travelled over the Indian sub-continent on its eastward course. By this time it had gathered a speed that must have been greater than the speed of light. By 1911, the year in which the sound was heard in China, it had already been heard on the far side of the pacific, in Mexico. It had already touched off the Mexican Revolution of 1910.

By 1910, the eastward-travelling American sputnik had come round, full circle, to re-visit the New World. But it did not stop at that point. Its momentum was still unexhausted. It sped forward for the second time over the Atlantic to re-awaken the Old World’s seven sleepers with still more thunderous reverberations than it had detonated at its first visitation. In 1917 Russia heard that American sound for the second time, and this time she heard it with a vengeance. Turkey heard it for the second time after the end of the First World War, and this time the sound touched off the radical Westernizing Turkish revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Compared with this second Turkish revolution of 1919-’28, the Turkish revolution of 1908 had been half-hearted. In April 1923, just one hundred and forty-eight years after the firing of that shot, far away, at the bridge at Concord, Massachusetts, I heard the sound reach Ankara, Turkey’s new capital, where I happened, at that moment, to find myself. There and then, I was given an inkling of what it must have felt like to be in the streets of Paris in 1789 or beside the bridge at Concord in 1775.

The sound did not flag or falter. It went on making its second circuit of the globe. In China, in 1948, its second visitation produced the same enormously enhanced effects as its previous second visitations in Russia and in Turkey. Speeding across the Pacific for the second time, the indefatigable sound called the Bolivian miners to arms and roused the Guatemalan peasants to demand a re-distribution of the land. In 1960 it roused the peasants of Cuba. Fidel Castro must have been surprised and gratified by the attention that he has won for himself in the United States. He has had the advantage of standing so close to the American people’s ear that, by shouting into it, he has been able to make it tingle. He wanted to annoy America, and he succeeded. But, if he had not had the luck to be so close to you, his oratory would have been drowned; for, before the end of 1960, the sound of the embattled American farmers’ shot had crossed the Atlantic for the third time and had roused up the whole of Africa from Sharpeville to Algiers.

At this moment at which I am speaking to you here in this room, I am surprised that I have succeeded, like Fidel Castro, in making my annoying words heard above that other sound’s roar. For, by now, the sound of the embattled farmers’ shot “is gone out through all the Earth”, to quote the Psalmist’s words. The noise has become world-wide and it has become deafening. Jefferson hit the mark when he said that “the disease of liberty is catching”.

“By the rude bridge that arched the flood,
Their flag to April’s breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood,
And fired the shot heard round the world.

The foe long since in silence slept;
Alike the conqueror silent sleeps;
And Time the ruined bridge has swept
Down the dark stream that seaward creeps.

On this green bank, by this soft stream,
We set to-day a votive stone;
That memory may their deeds redeem,
When, like our sires, our sons are gone.

Spirit, that made those heroes dare
To die, and leave their children free,
Bid Time and Nature gently spare
The shaft we raise to them and thee.”

Emerson wrote Concord Hymn in 1836 for the dedication of the Obelisk, a battle monument in Concord, Massachusetts that commemorated the contributions of area citizens at the Battle of Lexington and Concord, April 19 1775, the first battle of the American Revolution. The Declaration of Independence was adopted by the Continental Congress on July 4 1776. Emerson’s grandfather was at the bridge on the day of the battle; their family home, The Old Manse, was next to the bridge; and Emerson is known to have written the hymn while living there. And in 1837, the hymn was sung during Concord’s Fourth of July celebration to one of the greatest tunes ever composed: the Old Hundredth.

America and the World Revolution, OUP, 1962

Flying past Sodom

June 25 2008

On March 17 I flew from Kuwait City to Sharm El Sheikh. The plane was tiny, only a few passengers, but it had the usual inflight map screens showing location, time remaining etc.

In an earlier post I had written:

“The problem with [...] inflight map software is that you can’t have a long topographical reverie, alternating between the window of the plane and the screen, and test yourself by it, because the screen keeps changing. Mine went through eight or nine different views, most of which told me nothing of interest. So the spell kept being broken. At the moment I needed the detailed screen it was no longer there. It doesn’t allow you to select different screens.

“The displayed information is crude, random and inaccurate. The company which supplies this primitive software could do a serious deal with Google Earth and Google Maps.”

Apparently some airlines do now allow you to track your journey on Google Maps.

Towards the end of the flight to Sharm El Sheikh, the map showed the town of Sodom prominently some way to the north.

It didn’t show much else. For a moment, I thought I was imagining it, but there the word stayed.

Perhaps the map-maker was having some fun. Sodom is not a modern city. It was a town in the most ancient phase of Palestine, possibly on the plain of the Jordan River, possibly south of the Dead Sea, which, together with Gomorrah, Admah, Zeboim and Bela (also called Zoar), was destroyed by fire and brimstone from heaven because of the wickedness of its inhabitants. The cities have also been called the Pentapolis, and the Cities of the Plain.

The Jordan flows north to south. It starts north of Galilee, on the slopes of Mount Hermon in Lebanon, and forms the entire western border of the occupied Golan Heights. It enters and exits the Sea Galilee and flows down to the Dead Sea. The west bank after Galilee is first Israel and then the occupied West Bank. Most of the Dead Sea (not the southern tip) is aligned with the occupied territories. The east bank is Jordan.

In Genesis 18, God informs Abraham that he plans to destroy Sodom because of its wickedness. Abraham pleads with God not to destroy it, and God agrees that he would not destroy the city if there were 50 righteous people in it, then 45, then 30, then 20, or even ten righteous people. The Lord’s two angels only found one righteous person living in Sodom, Abraham’s nephew Lot. Consequently, God destroyed the city.

As Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed with fire and brimstone, Lot’s wife looked back longingly at them, and she was transformed into a pillar of salt. In Ezekiel 16:48-50 God accuses Jerusalem of being worse than Sodom.

The flight map was probably referring – strangely – to an industrial operation called the Dead Sea Works, which operates in the southern basin of the Sea in Israel: a series of evaporation ponds producing potash. The site is called Sdom (סדום in Hebrew). Nearby is Mount Sdom (הר סדום), Jabal Usdum in Arabic, which consists mainly of salt. In the Plain of Sdom (מישור סדום) to the south there are a few springs and two small agricultural villages.

The picture above shows the destruction of Sodom in the hands of the illustrator, for whom no obvious images of vice came to mind, of the Nuremberg Chronicle. Who are the other figures?

A bank of the Jordan near the Baptism Complex

L’italiano in Turchia

June 9 2008

This post is a really a continuation of yesterday’s.

A few weeks ago a friend asked:

“Are you also blogging as Murat Iyigün?”

Murat Iyigün’s May 13 post, under the heading Donizetti Pașa, read:

“Gaetano Donizetti is the well-known, early-19th century Italian opera composer. His older brother, Giuseppe Donizetti might have established a lesser reputation in the Occident, but he surely made his mark in the Orient.

“How he did is an interesting parable on the Ottoman Empire’s efforts to westernize, at a time when the European economic takeoff was becoming undeniable and the decaying empire was at the grip of an ecclesiastical [ecclesiastical?] identity crisis.

“While the European Industrial Revolution did not begin in full swing until the mid-[surely late-]18th century, the relative decline of the Ottomans and the rise of its western neighbors had begun to yield ubiquitous signs as early as the late-16th century. There is no doubt that the economic awakening of the West and the relative stagnation of the once-mighty Ottomans was a source of cognitive dissonance for the Ottomans. This explains why the prototype reformist Ottoman sultans, such as Osman II and Murad IV, primarily acted upon the premise of western inferiority and their instincts typically involved a stronger emphasis on the Muslim-Ottoman fundamentals.

“As western advances continued unabated and the Ottoman stagnation became undeniable, the distinction between ‘modernization’ and ‘westernization’ started to blur for Ottoman rulers. This is the setting in which Mahmud II begun his ambitious reform plan in the early-19th century, covering all facets of Ottoman life, but primarily focused on the military, political and economic spheres. With the belief in the superiority of all things Ottoman and Islamic long gone, Mahmud’s reform attempts now reflected the ‘dominance of all things western.’ Thus, when his attention turned to revamping the Ottoman military, Mahmud decided that western style military uniforms and a military band would help. This is when the empire tapped a Sicilian named Giuseppe Donizetti.

“Giuseppe Donizetti played a significant role in the introduction of European music to the Ottoman military. Apart from overseeing the training of the European-style military bands of Mahmud’s army, he taught music at the palace to the members of the Ottoman royal family, the princes and the ladies of the harem, is believed to have composed the first national anthem of the Ottoman Empire, supported the annual Italian opera season in Pera (a quaint district of Istanbul), organized concerts and operatic performances at court, and played host to a number of eminent virtuosi who visited Istanbul at the time, such as Franz Liszt, Parish Alvars and Leopold de Meyer.

“By the time he passed away in 1856, Donizetti had attained the Ottoman rank of paşa and he is now buried in the vaults of the St. Esprit Cathedral, near Beyoğlu, Istanbul.”

___

The friend who sent me this should have said that it sounds like Toynbee. Toynbee would have written it more precisely. (He was probably referring to my ability to drag composers at will into strange contexts.)

Toynbee was interested in the fact that non-Western societies “modernised” themselves along quasi-Western lines in response to the challenge of the “West”. But Murat Iyigün’s post reminded me of Bernard Lewis. I got home and picked up What Went Wrong? There, over three not very dense or piquant pages, was that story of Donizetti frère.

Lewis doesn’t mention that the first opera ever staged in Turkey was Gaetano Donizetti’s Belisario, in 1840.

Or that, later, Paul Hindemith was enlisted by the Turks in the cause of modernisation. He made several visits to Ankara in the 1930s, in the service of Atatürk, to advise on musical education at the State Conservatory.

Giuseppe Donizetti’s presence in Constantinople is presented as evidence of a decline. “When a foreign influence appears in something as central to a culture as an imperial foundation and a cathedral-mosque, there is clearly some faltering of cultural self-confidence.”

Why is Bernard Lewis’s lucidly-written book troubling? What is the dreariness that hangs over it? Something feels not right even before one disagrees in detail. Is it only that one has absorbed the propaganda of the anti-Lewisites? It was patronisingly and provocatively titled. It was published in 2002, post-9/11, but pre-Iraq. It was written pre-9/11, but not “long” before, as Said claims.

Lewis was originally British, and Jewish, but lives in the US. He is the Cleveland E Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton. At 92, he may be the world’s oldest somewhat active historian. Toynbee’s biographer William McNeill is 90. So is Robert Conquest. Eric Hobsbawm is 91 today.

No doubt Lewis’s essentially Ottoman, rather than Arab, specialisation made him into more of a historian of decline than he would have been if he had been a true Arabist. He has been called “the neocon’s historian”. Who was his most eloquent critic? Edward Said. Said was attacking Lewis as early as 1978, in Orientalism. At a roundtable in Egypt in 2003 reported by Al Ahram Weekly, the English weekly edition of Al Ahram, a few months before he died, Said said: “Bernard Lewis hasn’t set foot in the Middle East, in the Arab world, for at least 40 years. He knows something about Turkey, I’m told, but he knows nothing about the Arab world.” Though he does speak Turkish and Arabic.

Lewis has attacked the ideas in Orientalism. A grand attack came only last year, with Ibn Warraq’s Defending the West, which I mentioned in the last post. This is, in the end, polemic. Said and Scruton also offer polemic. So does Lewis. But Scruton is at least a trained philosopher, unlike Warraq. The problem with Warraq is that, learned as he sometimes appears to be, he gets carried away. It is beyond ridiculous to call Gérôme – the man who, with Bouguereau, brought French academic painting to a climax in the nineteenth century – as he does in the final paragraph, one of “the great Western artists”: anyone who reads that first would be immediately excused for reading no further. (There is a website – Art Renewal – which tries to make points like this. One of so many US sites and foundations which hijack old European things to make them serve narrow agendas.)

Here is an article by Warraq in the journal I called slightly-suspect in the last post, when linking to something by Scruton in it. And here is an attack by Bernard Lewis on Saidian Orientalism in The New York Review of Books (but you need to buy it).

If you want a sense of Said versus Lewis and don’t want to struggle with Orientalism, have a look at his review of What Went Wrong? in Harper’s, July 2002. It also reviews, with faint praise, Karen Armstrong’s Islam, A Short History. Unlike Lewis, Armstrong has quite a good reputation in the Arab world. Her book had appeared in 2000. It was reprinted in 2002, to cash in on post-9/11.

Said touches on music.

“When Lewis’s book was reviewed in the New York Times by no less an intellectual luminary than Yale’s Paul Kennedy, there was only uncritical praise, as if to suggest that the canons of historical evidence should be suspended where ‘Islam’ is the subject. Kennedy was particularly impressed with Lewis’s assertion, in an almost totally irrelevant chapter on ‘Aspects of Cultural Change,’ [that’s the one that mentions Donizetti frère] that alone of all the cultures of the world Islam has taken no interest in Western music. Quite without any justification at all, Kennedy then lurched on to lament the fact that Middle Easterners had deprived themselves even of Mozart! For that indeed is what Lewis suggests (though he doesn’t mention Mozart). Except for Turkey and Israel, ‘Western art music,’ he categorically states, ‘falls on deaf ears’ in the Islamic world.

“Now, as it happens, this is something I know quite a bit about, but it would take some direct experience or a moment or two of actual life in the Muslim world to realize that what Lewis says is a total falsehood, betraying the fact that he hasn’t set foot in or spent any significant time in Arab countries. Several major Arab capitals have very good conservatories of Western music: Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Tunis, Rabat, Amman – even Ramallah on the West Bank. These have produced literally thousands of excellent Western-style musicians who have staffed the numerous symphony orchestras and opera companies that play to sold-out auditoriums all over the Arab world. There are numerous festivals of Western music there, too, and in the case of Cairo (where I spent a great deal of my early life more than fifty years ago) they are excellent places to learn about, listen to, and see Western instrumental and vocal music performed at quite high levels of skill. The Cairo Opera House has pioneered the performance of opera in Arabic, and in fact I own a commercial CD of Mozart’s Marriage of Figaro sung most competently in Arabic. I am a decent pianist and have played, studied, written about, and practiced that wonderful instrument all of my life; the significant part of my musical education was received in Cairo from Arab teachers, who first inspired a love and knowledge of Western music (and, yes, of Mozart) that has never left me. In addition, I should also mention that for the past three years I have been associated with Daniel Barenboim in sponsoring a group of young Arab and Israeli musicians to come together for three weeks in the summer to perform orchestral and chamber music under Barenboim (and in 1999 with Yo-Yo Ma) at an elevated, international level. All of the young Arabs received their training in Arab conservatories. How could Barenboim and I have staffed the West-Östlicher Diwan workshop, as it is called, if Western music had fallen on such deaf Muslim ears? Besides, why should Lewis and Kennedy use the supposed absence of Western music as a club to beat ‘Islam’ with anyway? Isn’t there an enormously rich panoply of Islamic musics to take account of instead of indulging in this ludicrous browbeating?”

___

I can vouch for the sold-out performances at the Cairo Opera House. That house (1988, Japanese architect) is the successor of the Khedivial Opera House, where Aida had its first performance in 1871 and which burned down in 1971. There are people in Cairo who never miss a chance to hear Western music. They are a very small minority, but are part of the scene, and often young.

Opera, and Western art generally, in the UAE is another subject. It now gets huge investment, far more than any subsidy in Europe, but it’s pretty hard to discern any underlying interest. It seems more a case of buying in, in a very UAE way, more Western luxury goods.

Warraq has a section on Mozart. He doesn’t mention (there would have been no point to be made in doing so) his unfinished opera buffa, L’oca del Cairo, The Goose of Cairo – which sounds like a kind of dry run for Figaro.

Edward Said had a commercial CD of Figaro sung in Arabic. I have a 3-CD box of Cosí fan tutte, also “most competently” sung – but I won’t claim that Arabic ideally suits the music. Opera in the Middle East tends to be in Italian.

In the ’80s I saw a Turkish opera at the Turkish State Opera at the Atatürk Cultural Centre in Istanbul: a nationalist affair. In the early ’90s, an American friend of mine spent several months conducting there.

On May 27 2006 I managed to attend the 250th-birthday concert of Mozart at the Cairo Opera House, played by the Cairo Symphony Orchestra. 70% or more of the players were Egyptian.

The WEF “on” the Middle East

June 3 2008

The World Economic Forum’s regional meetings used to have names such as The Middle East Economic Summit. The one in Sharm El Sheikh last month, which I half-attended, used a formula which they first adopted a few years ago. It was “The World Economic Forum on the Middle East”.

Illogical name. The WEF isn’t an event, it’s a foundation. One wasn’t even supposed to call Davos “Davos” in the old days. It was the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting. The institution was all. The WEF isn’t pronouncing on anything either, in case anyone took the “on” that way.

There are now three middle easts.

A) Iran, Syria, their non-state allies, Hamas and Hezbollah, and their ideological allies on the street.

B) Israel and the two countries that have made peace with it, Jordan and Egypt: non-oil economies.

C) The Sunni oil economies of the Gulf.

Iraq is poised between all three. Lebanon, a half-colony of A), is torn several ways. The WEF has always pitched its regional tent in B), though all sides are welcome at Davos. I wish it would move away from the second-class resort of Sharm El Sheikh (an Israeli creation, between 1967 and ’82) to a place where large numbers of people struggle and work, but the Egyptian government built a congress centre there for them and it looks set to alternate between there and the Jordanian Dead Sea. But it could go to one of the boom towns. Or into the eye of the storm. It’s in the wrong place. Or perhaps that middle ground is where it has to be.

The Sharm meeting was sometimes impressive. The programme was focussed, but one could wish for the return of some of the Forum’s homelier touches. Bush’s speech made no impression. The Iraqi cabinet did make an impression. Many of the participants reminded one why the Forum is still the non-pareil organiser of such meetings. One or two had one thinking viscerally, with EM Forster’s Maurice, “how unfit they were to set standards or control the future”.

Palestine Remembered

May 9 2008

Records of refugee camps, photographs from the nineteenth century to the present, and oral history at www.palestineremembered.com. Use with care.

Nakba 60

May 9 2008

Global event calendar

Advice to Hamas

April 22 2008

qunfuzcreation on the turf wars in Iraq. And another offering advice to Hamas. Hamas should improve its “treatment of protesting Fatah supporters and of PLO-allied and other trade unions”, which “has not been ideal. Even if Fatah is the party unwilling to respect the people’s democratic choice, tactics of beatings and intimidation do not elevate Hamas to a much higher moral plane.”

It should drop reference(s) to, and the mindset of, that hoary old hoax the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which has influenced the Hamas charter.

“Believing that all Jews are collaborators in a vast conspiracy does not enable us to make alliances with those Jews who have done more than most Arabs to expose the crimes of zionism. I refer to Jewish anti-zionists like the American Norman Finkelstein, who recently met the Hizbullah leadership, or the Israeli historian Ilan Pappé, who has carefully documented the massacres and expulsions of 47 and 48. The anti-zionist Orthodox Jews of Neturei Karta believe that the state of Israel is a blasphemy against Judaism, and they campaign for Palestinian rights on this basis. And there were some early zionists, like Ahad Ha’am, who wanted Palestine to be a spiritual centre for the Jews rather than an ethno-state, and who condemned Jewish anti-Arab racism. [I added the links here.]

“Next, Hamas leaders and many other Arabs have used the term ‘holocaust’ too easily to refer to Palestinian suffering, and have at times, like Ahmadinejad, come dangerously close to [Jewish] holocaust denial. [...] The holocaust is one of the best documented crimes in history. In every instance that I am aware of, researchers who question the holocaust have an antisemitic agenda.

“I have met ignorant Arabs (I’m not talking about Hamas now) who think that Hitler was a great leader because ‘he stood up to the Jews’ – as if Hitler was a leftist liberator of the Arab nation. Hitler was not a hero but a racist. He didn’t murder Jews because he was an anti-zionist but because he believed them to be members of a subhuman race. This repulsive ideology contradicts morality, specifically Islam’s anti-racist tenets, and potentially targets the Arabs, also Semites, as much the Jews. Fortunately Europe at the time of fascist rule did not have an Arab population. The political descendants of Hitler in Europe would certainly burn Arab babies if they had a chance, just as the Nazis burnt Jewish babies.”

I have met these Hitler-admirers, too. Many Arabs do think as lazily as that. Perhaps they are commoner among the older generation, who are closer to the Second World War, when there were sympathisers with Germany all over the Arab world not necessarily because Germans were anti-Jewish, but because they were fighting the British and French.

“Again, we can see many similarities between anti-Jewish and anti-Palestinian racism. One factor in Hitler’s antisemitism was Jewish prominence in the Communist Party and in the internationalist movement. One key factor in Arab and Western suspicion of the Palestinians is their justified reputation for involvement in politically subversive movements. Both the Palestinians and the Jews have (or had) good reason to be subversive.

[...]

“Of course, recognition by Arabs and Muslims of Jewish suffering in Europe is not as morally imperative as recognition by Israeli Jews of Palestinian dispossession, because the Arabs are not responsible for Jewish suffering. But this recognition would help the Arabs to understand why so many Jews support zionism, which was an extreme minority ideology amongst Jews before the rise of fascism. Most European Jews in the 1920s were socialists, not zionists. Most had no desire to leave the European lands of their fathers to settle in a dusty Ottoman province. Many European Jews did not even consider themselves Jews until the Nazis declared them so. Without fascism and the holocaust there would have been no Israel, no nakba [nabka is an Arab word applied to the disasters of 1948]. We should blame Hitler every bit as much as we blame Balfour or Herzl.

“Supporting, or seeming to support, European antisemitism makes the Arabs easy targets for those who claim that Arab opposition to zionism is racist. More than that, if the resistance cleans its language of racist generalisations and illogicalities it will be better able to fight the grotesque euphemisms of its opponents – such as the ‘peace process’ that is really a long version of what used to be called a ‘pacification campaign’, or Condoleezza Rice’s ‘birth pangs of a new Middle East’, which were in fact the agonies of mass murder in Lebanon.

“As Nasrallah is wise enough to state, the Jews are not Israel, and Israel is not the Jews. Hamas should state this clearly too, again and again, and at the same time it should continue to build its capacity for resistance.”

He doesn’t seem to expect the Palestinians to produce a talent of the order of Mandela or Gandhi, who would be the focus of the world’s sympathy and solidarity with them and might help them to achieve lasting results.

“And finally, there is a gesture to be made which would reach towards a post-Zionist future: to offer Israeli Jews passports in the future Palestine, or to encourage Palestinians to apply for Israeli citizenship. But this gesture implies an acceptance that Palestine will never be an Islamic state, at least not as conventionally understood. It may be that Hamas will therefore be unable to take this step. We may need to wait for another movement, at a more positive stage of the struggle.”

Bringing a washing machine to Ghassan

April 16 2008

southjerusalem.com/2008/04/15/103/

Good Friday

March 21 2008

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gaza-wounded-man1.jpg

Jerusalem 1971 and Ahad Ha’am

March 19 2008

Two letters to The Times.

East Jerusalem had been under Israeli occupation since the Six-Day War.

March 15 1971

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October 2 1971

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Ahad Ha’am (1856-1927) – or Asher Hirsch Ginsberg – is sometimes contrasted with Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935), whom I mentioned recently. Ha’am’s Zionism can be described as secular and as spiritual, but it wasn’t Kook’s “religious Zionism”. He was born near Kiev, in Russia, to Hasidic parents. Wikipedia: “Ahad Ha’am traveled frequently to Palestine and published reports about the progress of Jewish settlement there. They were generally glum. They reported on hunger, on Arab dissatisfaction and unrest, on unemployment, and on people leaving Palestine. In an essay soon after his 1891 journey to the area he warned against the ‘great error’, noticeable among Jewish settlers, of treating the fellahin with contempt, of regarding ‘all Arabs as savages of the desert, a people similar to a donkey’. He believed that rather than aspiring to establish a ‘Jewish National Home’ or state immediately, Zionism must bring Jews to Palestine gradually, while turning it into a cultural centre. At the same time, it was incumbent upon Zionism to inspire a revival of Jewish national life in the Diaspora. Then and only then, he said, would the Jewish people be strong enough to assume the mantle of building a nation state. Ahad Ha’am did not believe that the impoverished settlers of his day, labouring in Palestine far from the minds of most Jews, would ever build a Jewish homeland.”

He lived for many years from 1908 in London, but died in Tel Aviv. His gradualist and unpolitical approach to Zionism brought him into conflict with Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), the founder of modern political Zionism.

Information about the co-signatory of these letters: The Times, August 21 and 31 1984

Jerusalem 1968

March 18 2008

The Times, May 2 1968. Presumably the anniversary was the twenty-year anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel, though that fell on May 14. The one-year anniversary of the end of the ’67 War would follow on June 10.

68-times-may-02.png

The Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding had been founded in 1967 as a response to the Six-Day War.

Three years earlier, the Arab Information Centre in London had reprinted an article by Toynbee which had appeared in International Affairs for distribution as a pamphlet by the Arab League. I posted it here. It begins: “Today, Britain’s relations with the Arab world are worse than those of any other Western country.”

The parade met these protesting Palestinian women in East Jerusalem. They are dressed in a far more western way than one would expect today.

jerusalem-68.gif

Rabbi Kook

March 17 2008

abraham_isaac_kook_1924

Picture: US Library of Congress via Wikipedia

A single gunman, Alaa Abu Dhein, a 26 year-old Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem, infiltrated the Mercaz HaRav yeshiva on the night of March 6. Is it also in occupied Jerusalem? He began firing at students, killing eight of them, and wounding at least 15 others, before he was killed, in turn, by a part-time student, Yitzhak Dadon, who was also an off-duty soldier of the Israeli Defense Forces.

Hamas has claimed responsibility. A yeshiva is a Jewish religious school. A hesder yeshiva is one that combines religious instruction in the Torah and Talmud with military service. Students at a hesder yeshiva are not necessarily hardal, supporters of religious Zionism, though I imagine that many are. Not all orthodox Israelis are Zionists. Although a soldier killed the murderer, Mercaz HaRav isn’t a hesder yeshiva. Rav is Hebrew for rabbi. I don’t know what Ha refers to. Is Mercaz related to the Turkish (in which case Turkish-via-Arabic) merkez, which means central?

This school was founded by an important figure, Abraham Isaac Kook, Rav Kook. He was born in Russian Latvia and moved to Ottoman Palestine in 1904. He was Chief Rabbi for Palestine under the British Mandate. There are many kinds of Zionism, but Kook’s “religious Zionism”, which saw the return of the Jews as part of a religious destiny, can be distinguished from secular Zionism and from purely spiritual Zionism. Robin Yassin-Kassab:

“The [Merkez HaRav] yeshiva was founded in 1924 by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, one of the founders of religious Zionism. Traditional Orthodox Jews understood the term ‘religious Zionism’ to be an oxymoron; they believed that the ‘return’ to Israel would be effected when the Messiah arrived, that in any case ‘Israel’ signified a spiritual condition and not an armed state, and that until the coming of the Messiah Jews were commanded to live peacefully among the nations, to oppress no-one. The principled religious Jews of Neturei Karta, sadly reviled by Zionists, still hold to this position. You can see them on demonstrations for Palestine, hatted and ringletted, holding signs which say ‘Zionism is a Blasphemy against Judaism’ and ‘Demolish the State of Israel.’

“European Fascism destroyed the majority voice of traditional religious Jews and made the minority blood-and-soil movement of Zionism mainstream. People like Rabbi Kook were able to twist Judaism into a call for racial supremacy and the violent settlement of all of ‘Eretz Israel.’ Biblical texts referring to ancient tribal warfare were understood as literal contemporary commands. For example, Numbers 33:50-55: ‘When ye are passed over Jordan into the land of Canaan;/Then shall ye drive out all the inhabitants of the land…/And ye shall dispossess the inhabitants of the land.’ This is the ideology that drives the ugliest of armed West Bank settlers.

“It is easy to see analogies with the worst forms of Islamism, which insist on literal approaches to sacred texts, which justify hatred of other religious communities by decontextualised readings of ancient battles, which have transformed Islam under the force of trauma and disconcertingly rapid social change from a spiritual and mystical tradition to a political programme obsessed with state power.”

I am not sure whether Yassin-Kassab is being fair to Kook or is correct in implying that in 1948 the voice of “traditional religious Jews” had already been “destroyed”, but it is also hard to see how the drive and momentum of the Zionist “project” could have been sustained without religious Zionism. It may be too much to hope that it could be abandoned and that a well-defended Israel which was not supported by such an ideology could now survive behind revised borders.

I’ve quoted from this part of Yassin-Kassab’s post because it is historical, but his blog should be on anyone’s reading list who wants a sense of proportion in what he or she reads on Palestine (which is not the world’s only problem). It is true to say that Israel’s responses to Palestinian resistance are not reported properly. I know from first-hand experience what the penalties for straying off the approved path are, though I was not the writer. The fact that Yassin-Kassab is knowledgeable and eloquent helps, but I don’t want to aestheticise his blog. It is just better than most. Most blogs are diffuse. With the majority in any field, you don’t even know what the blogger is talking about most of the time. Substance and concision, and pointing to truths that stare one in the face, are the mark of a mind.

I’m not sure, since he hasn’t yet published it, whether Yassin-Kassab’s medium will be the novel. Maybe he should make a film like The Battle of Algiers. Nor are blogs changing the world. The rise of blogging has coincided with a growing sense by the governments of the countries that blog with impunity that they can act with impunity.

Reporting of Palestinian matters in Germany, except by CNN-wannabes like Deutsche Welle, but perhaps even by them, is deeper than it is in England or the US. Y-K mentions BBC World (Making Sense of It All). Can there be any media of communication so thin-blooded, so unnourishing, occupying such a narrow emotional bandwidth, as these repetitive global channels, which claim to be doing so much? The BBC’s main preoccupation for months was the kidnapping of one of its journalists in Gaza, at roughly the same time as some British sailors, captured by Iran, were given space for their public display. CNN in these matters sometimes relies on the world’s most unjustifiably hyped journalist, though she is less biased than most of her peers, Christiane Amanpour.

Assimilationists and Zionists

March 3 2008

This passage, published in 1934, is mainly interesting because it shows a more sympathetic view of Zionism than anything in his post-war writing. But even here, Toynbee points to the existence of the Arabs.

The ultimate aim of the Zionists is to liberate the Jewish people from the peculiar psychological complex induced by the penalization to which they have been subject for centuries in the Gentile World. In this ultimate aim, the Zionists are at one with the Assimilationist School among the “emancipated” Jews in the enlightened countries of the West. They agree with the Assimilationists in wishing to cure the Jews of being “a peculiar people”. They part company with them, however, in their estimate of the Assimilationist prescription, which the Zionists reject as inadequate for coping with the malady.

The ideal of the Assimilationists is that the Jew in Holland, France, England, or America should become a Dutchman, Frenchman, Englishman, or American, as the case may be, “of Jewish religion”. They argue that there is no reason why a Jewish citizen of any of these enlightened countries should fail to be a completely satisfied and satisfactory member of Society just because he happens to go to synagogue on Saturday instead of going to church on Sunday. To this argument, the Zionists have two replies. In the first place, they point out that, even if the Assimilationist prescription were capable of producing the result which its advocates claim for it, it is only applicable in the enlightened countries in which the Jews have been granted “emancipation”. It offers no solution for the Jewish problem in Eastern Europe, where the régime of the ghetto still virtually prevails and where bona fide “emancipation” is not in prospect.

[Footnote: This passage was written before the “Aryan” outbreak against the Jews in Germany which accompanied the German National-Socialist Revolution of 1933. This appalling recrudescence of militant anti-Semitism in one of the leading countries of the Western World still further strengthens the already strong Zionist case. For the German outbreak of 1933 can only be compared – in its brutality, its hysteria, and its thoroughness – with the Castilian outbreak of A.D. 1391 [Toledo]. If this could happen in the present age in a country in which the Jews had long since been emancipated, then where in the World can the Jewish Diasporà feel itself really secure?]

In the second place – and this is the more trenchant of the two Zionist attacks upon the Assimilationist position – the Zionists contend that, even in the most enlightened Gentile community in the World, the Jewish problem cannot be solved by a Gentile-Jewish “social contract” under which the Gentile “emancipates” the Jew and the Jew “assimilates” himself to the Gentile. This attempt at a contractual solution is vitiated, in the Zionists’ view, by the false premise which vitiates the classical “social contract” theory of Rousseau. It presupposes that human beings are social atoms and that a human society is an aggregate of these atoms which is held together by a legal nexus between the individuals as, in the physical universe, an aggregation of physical atoms is held together by the laws of Physics according to the “classical” physical science of the nineteenth century. The Zionist, arguing ad hominem, insists that the Jew, at any rate, is not in fact an autonomous individual who can make and unmake his social relations as he pleases. To be a Jew is to be a human being whose social environment is Jewry. It is an essential part of the Jew’s individuality that he is a member of the living Jewish community and an heir to the ancient Jewish tradition. He cannot cut off his Jewishness and cast it from him without self-mutilation; and thus, for the Jew, an emancipation-assimilation contract with a Gentile nation has the same kind of consequence as the legal instrument which turns a freeman into a slave. It “deprives him of half of his manhood”. [A footnote refers to a proverb quoted earlier in the same volume which is placed in the mouth of the slave-swineherd Eumaeus in the Odyssey: “The day of enslavement deprives Man of half his Manhood. [...] (Od. XVII, ll. 322-3.)”]

A Jew who, by process of emancipation and assimilation, attempts, in a social contract with his Gentile neighbours, to turn himself into a Dutchman or a Frenchman or an Englishman or an American “of Jewish religion” is simply mutilating his Jewish personality without having any prospect at all of acquiring the full personality of a Dutchman or whatever the Gentile nationality of his choice may be.

Thus, in the Zionist view, the emancipation and assimilation of the Jew as an individual is a wrong method of pursuing a right aim. Genuine assimilation is indeed the true solution for the Jewish problem and ought therefore to be the ultimate goal of Jewish endeavours; but the Jews can never escape from being “a peculiar people” by masquerading as Englishmen or Frenchmen. If they are to succeed in becoming “like all the nations”, [Footnote: I Samuel viii. 5 and 20.] they must seek assimilation on a national and not on an individual basis. Instead of trying to assimilate individual Jews to individual Englishmen or Frenchmen, they must try to assimilate Jewry itself to England and France. Jewry must become a nation in effective possession of a national home, and this on the ground from which the historic roots of Judaism have sprung. When a new generation of Jews has grown up in Palestine in a Jewish national environment, then, and not till then, the Jewish problem will be solved by the reappearance in the World of a type of Jew which has been almost non-existent for the past two thousand years: a Jew who has genuinely ceased to be “not as other men are”. [Footnote: Luke xviii. 11.]

Though the Zionist Movement as a practical undertaking is only half a century old, its social philosophy has already been justified by results. In the Jewish agricultural settlements that have been founded in Palestine within the last fifty years, the [eastern European] children of the ghetto have been transformed out of all recognition into a pioneering peasantry which displays many of the characteristics of the Gentile European colonial type in the New World. The Zionists have made no miscalculation in their forecast of the effect which the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine would have upon Jewry itself. The tragic misfortune into which they have fallen, in company with the Mandatory Power, is their inability to arrive at an understanding with the existing Arab population of the country: prior claimants and possessors who have been roused to resistance by the very spirit of Western Nationalism which has been the inspiration of Zionism itself.

Agricultural settlement in Palestine by Zionists, mainly from eastern Europe, had begun in a serious way in the 1880s. Settlements that were organised on communistic lines from c 1910 were, in the revived Hebrew language, called kibbutzim. Here is a list of kibbutzim with dates of foundation.

Wikipedia: “While the kibbutzim lasted for several generations as utopian communities, most of today’s kibbutzim are scarcely distinguishable from the capitalist enterprises and regular towns to which the kibbutzim were originally supposed to be alternatives. Today, farming has been partially abandoned in many cases, with hi-tech industries very common in their place.”

In September 1973 I worked at Farod, a fruit-growing kibbutz within sight of Galilee which had been founded by Hungarian Jews in 1949.

Barkai kibbutz, Wadi Ara

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A Study of History, Vol II, OUP, 1934

Gaza

March 2 2008

Robin Yassin-Kassab on Gaza.

Like Mahmoud Darwish

February 27 2008

qunfuzcreation on Arab poetry. I’ve added the links:

“In the contemporary Arab world, Bilad ash-Sham, or the Levant, surely comes first for poetry. Whether you’re looking for Muhammad Maghout’s bitter satire, anti-romanticism, and defence of the poor and the peasants, or for Mahmoud Darwish’s lyrical nationalism – whether you appreciate the modernist obscurity of Adonis or the powerful simplicity of Nizar Qabbani; you will turn to Syria and Palestine for your verse fix. The Arabs certainly do. For poetry in the Middle East isn’t the elite preoccupation it has become in the West. Taxi drivers and market men will quote you snippets of Qabbani’s love poetry or angry anti-occupation verse according to their temperament and the twist of the conversation. Even the illiterate may know some Qabbani from hearing it quoted in the café or crooned by the Iraqi singer Kazem as-Saher, with orchestral accompaniment. When Arab rappers want to express hardcore identity, they proclaim: ‘I’m an Arab like Mahmoud Darwish!’ (the Dam crew from Palestine.) That’s how uncissy Arab poetry is.”

Imad Mughniyeh

February 26 2008

Qunfuz, a Syrian who used to live in Britain but now lives in Oman, on the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah leader in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s main leader is Hassan Nasrallah. Qunfuz’s after-comment is also worth reading. 

Eviction

January 7 2008

Israeli colonialism since the establishment of the state of Israel is one of the two blackest cases in the whole history of colonialism in the modern age; and its blackness is thrown into relief by its date. The East European Zionists have been practising colonialism in Palestine in the extreme form of evicting and robbing the native Arab inhabitants at the very time when the West European peoples have been renouncing their temporary rule over non-European peoples. The other outstanding black case is the eviction of five agricultural Amerindian peoples – the Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creeks, Cherokees, and Seminoles – from their ancestral homes in what are now the states of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee to “reservations” in what is now the state of Oklahoma. This eviction was started in 1820 and was completed for the most part by 1838. But the Cherokees were recalcitrant and the Seminoles resisted by force of arms. They [the Seminoles] withdrew into the swamps of Southern Florida, and their resistance there was overcome by the United States Army only in the course of the eighteen-forties. This nineteenth-century American colonialism was a crime; the Israeli colonialism, which was being carried on at the time when I was writing, was a crime that was also a moral anachronism.

Experiences, OUP, 1969

Christian submission

November 21 2007

In striking contrast to the series of Jewish insurrections against first Seleucid and then Roman rule during the three hundred years running from 166 B.C. to A.D. 135, the Christians never once rose in armed revolt against their Roman persecutors during the approximately equal period of time that elapsed between the beginning of Jesus’ mission and the conclusion of peace and [of an] alliance between the Roman Imperial Government and the Church in A.D. 313.

A Study of History, Vol VII, OUP, 1939

Calls across the Wall

October 24 2007

BBC Radio 4 documentary about a phone line between Israel and the Occupied Territories. It will be available for a few more days if the normal rule applies. News story here.

Zero Degree Turn – Iran and the Jews

October 21 2007

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Ahmadinejad (whose peasant’s eyes are like Berlusconi’s) sponsored a conference last year which questioned the historical truth of the Jewish holocaust. … Or Does It Explode? pointed out the irony that

“Iran rescued hundreds of Polish Jews (mostly children) from the Holocaust and then helped them immigrate to Palestine. The online Center for Iranian Jewish Oral History [based in LA] has a brief report [as far as I can see no longer there] on these ‘Children of Tehran’ who in 1942 were housed in a refugee tent camp in Dustan Tappeh, outside Tehran (not too far from today’s conference location). In 1942, Iranian authorities not only acknowledged the Holocaust – they bravely saved over 1,000 people from Hitler’s wrath. In 2006, the spirit of that noble deed has been abandoned, perhaps even inverted.

“As for the status of the 20,000 Jews who remain in Iran today (the second largest community in the Middle East), check out the new documentary from Ramin Farahani, an Iranian-Dutch filmmaker [Dutch genes make trouble in the Islamic world] whose Jews of Iran has recently been released. Farahani, a Muslim, spent weeks inside Iran’s Jewish community, yet found most Jews too afraid to open up. [The quotation that follows in this extract is from Haaretz.]

“‘The Jews’ fear of freely expressing themselves in front of the camera, and, incidentally, in front of others who may see the film, is apparent throughout the film. One scene shows an elderly Jewish woman lying in her hospital bed. She says she is alone, that her children live abroad and that there is no one to look after her. When the director asks her where they live, she answers that she believes they live in Israel, but then quickly adds: “God is my witness that I don’t have their address.” She later relates that they tried to take her with them when they left, “but then something happened.” She refuses to elaborate and bursts into tears …

“‘Farahani says Iranian citizens in general – and not just Jews – are unaccustomed to speaking freely about their problems. “If they’re already talking, they usually censor what they say,” he says. The Jews, however, are much more careful than others, he says. “They were very careful regarding every aspect of the movie. The community leaders permitted me to attend events and talk to people, but they were constantly watching over me. When I visited the Jewish youth organization in Tehran, for example, I sat with the members and tried to start a discussion about the problems they face as Jews at school or when trying to find a job, but I saw some people had decided in advance not to discuss these things. I was very disappointed.”

“‘… In the film, the only person who dares to speak directly about anti-Semitism is a girl named Farandis. Once, when she still attended public school, she left class for a drink of water, she relates. When she returned, she felt the students were looking at her strangely. Later, a friend told her that when she had stepped out, the teacher told the other students that because it was raining outside, Farandis had gotten wet and had therefore been contaminated. The teacher told them that anyone who touched her would also be infected, because the girl was now impure. As a result of this incident, Farandis transferred to a Jewish school and eventually left Iran. This, of course, made it easier for her to tell her story.

“‘Farahani says he met other Jews who described problems, insults and discrimination at the hands of Muslims, but says they were unwilling to repeat their stories for the camera. He says he realized there was no point in pressuring them to talk.’ [End of Haaretz quotation.]

“It’s hard to imagine the Iranian regime ever holding a conference to address this contemporary social discrimination. Better to corrupt the past than to face the corrupt present.”

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Part of the reason I have not done much on Iran in this blog yet is that I lost a long draft analysing, in my words, the history of Iran’s relations with Britain and America, but especially Britain. I managed to delete it while trying to do something clever and haven’t had the heart to return to it. I wanted to understand why Iran resents Britain, and I discovered clear answers. Like most British people, I had had a hazy understanding of the reality of historical Anglo-Iranian relations. Iran had never been a colony, so what was the problem?

Three middle eastern countries which had an especially bad experience with the British – Egypt, Iran and Palestine – were never officially colonies. The British imperial conscience is better than it should be because Iran does not weigh on it. Iran’s official loathing of America is really a transferred emotion.

So what were the Iranians doing rescuing Polish Jews during the war? Weren’t they, along with many Arabs, officially Axis sympathisers? Anything to do with modern Jewish history on a site you don’t know is suspect until proven to be reliable. As far as I can tell, Iran did not “rescue” the children from Poland, but a group of Jewish children left Poland, passed through Russia, and arrived in Iran, before moving to Israel. I am referring to an account here. Summarising and occasionally correcting/augmenting it:

Perhaps 300,000 refugees escaped from Poland to Russia after Germany conquered it in September 1939, or lived in regions annexed to the Soviet Union following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, which divided Poland between the two powers. At the beginning of 1940 the Soviet authorities began to expel Polish citizens to gulags in Siberia. When Germany invaded Russia in the following year, the Russians declared an amnesty for these refugees. A mass emigration started, towards Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Hungry and sick Jews wearing torn rags flooded Tashkent and Samarkand. At the same time, General Władysław Anders was freed from prison in Moscow. He founded the Polish Armies in Exile, which would attack Germany in Italy, passing through the Middle East.

At the end of 1941, Sikorski, prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile in London, convinced Stalin to send 25,000 Polish soldiers of the Anders armies to Iran, where they would be protected by Britain and would strengthen the British armies in the Middle East. 33,000 soldiers left, and 11,000 citizens with them, 3000 children among them, of which there were around 1,000 orphaned Jewish children.

The “Tehran Children” left in trains from Samarkand in Uzbekistan to Krasnovodsk in Turkmenistan, and from there crossed the Caspian Sea to the Iranian port of Pahlevi. “In Pahlevi, refugee tent camps were immediately erected. The Jewish children suffered from heat, starvation, sicknesses and also abuses by their fellow Poles. The situation changed once the Jewish Agency learned about the [...] camps and opened its Eretz Israel Office in Tehran.” They moved to Tehran.

In January 1943, they were moved from their tents in Tehran to Afhaz and then to the Iranian port of Bandar Shahpur (now Bandar Imam Khomeini), where they embarked on SS Dunera, bound for Karachi. This route was chosen because the Iraqis refused to grant them transit visas to pass through Iraq. From Karachi they boarded another ship, the Neurolia, bound for Suez. Then they crossed the Sinai Desert by train, were held in quarantine in El Arish for two days, and finally disembarked from the train in Atlit in Palestine on February 18 1943.

If I understand it correctly, a group of around 110 children may have arrived earlier, via Iraq, after the British suppressed Rashid Ali’s nationalist revolt in that officially-independent country in 1941.

Some of the children must still be alive. Some will have died in Israel’s wars.

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I have been in Iran only once and it told me that most of what you read about the country is false. I have been in the house of an Iranian Jew in Tehran. There are synagogues in Iran, and about 25,000 Jews. They have had a continuous and often insecure history there ever since Cyrus conquered the Babylonians: they had been in captivity in Iraq, but the Persians treated them well. They have constitutional rights in modern Iran. Most Muslims are above-averagely good at separating political from personal hatreds, and none more than the Palestinians. Even Khatami’s appalling successor wants to destroy Israel, not kill Jews. On the other hand, official attitudes, including that one, cause Iranian Jews to feel oppressed, as Farahani makes clear. And of course there is antisemitism in the wider population.

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… Or Does It Explode? quoted an article published in the Wall Street Journal on September 7. Here is a direct link to the article.

“Every Monday night at 10 o’clock, Iranians by the millions tune into Channel One to watch the most expensive show ever aired on the Islamic republic’s state-owned television. Its elaborate 1940s costumes and European locations are a far cry from the typical Iranian TV fare of scarf-clad women and gray-suited men.

“But the most surprising thing about the wildly popular show is that it is a heart-wrenching tale of European Jews during World War II.

“The hour-long drama, Zero Degree Turn, centers on a love story between an Iranian-Palestinian Muslim man and a French Jewish woman. Over the course of the 22 episodes, the hero saves his love from Nazi detention camps, and Iranian diplomats in France forge passports for the woman and her family to sneak on to airplanes carrying Iranian Jews to their homeland.

“On the surface, the message of the lavish, state-funded production appears sharply at odds with that sent out by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has repeatedly called the Holocaust a myth.

“In fact, the government’s spending on the show underscores the subtle and often sophisticated way in which the Iranian state uses its TV empire to send out political messages. The aim of the show, according to many inside and outside the country, is to draw a clear distinction between the government’s views about Judaism – which is accepted across Iranian society – and its stance on Israel – which the leadership denounces every chance it gets.

“‘Iranians have always differentiated between ordinary Jews and a minority of Zionists,’ says Hassan Fatthi, the show’s writer and director. ‘The murder of innocent Jews during World War II is just as despicable, sad and shocking as the killing of innocent Palestinian women and children by racist Zionist soldiers,’ he says.

“Mr. Fatthi, 48 years old, is a well-known director of historical fiction for television. In the past, his work has focused on Iranian history. But he also dabbles in comedy, winning international critical acclaim two years ago for a hit feature, Marriage, Iranian Style.

“He says he came up with the idea for Zero Degree Turn four years ago as he was reading books about World War II and stumbled across literature about [a] chargé d’affaires at the Iranian embassy in Paris. Abdol Hussein Sardari saved over a thousand European Jews by forging Iranian passports and claiming they belonged to an Iranian tribe.

“Mr. Fatthi says he chose the title because the world at the time was in dire circumstances, offering few options for avoiding the terrors to come. Shot on location in Paris and Budapest, the show stars Iranian heartthrob Shahab Husseini (sic) and is so popular that its theme song – an ode to getting lost in love – is a hit, too.

“‘It’s captivating. No matter where I am or what I’m doing, on Monday nights I find a television set and watch the show. So does every Jewish person I know here,’ says Morris Motamed, the lone Jew in parliament.

“Mr. Fatthi enlisted the help of Iran’s Jewish Association, an independent body that safeguards the community’s culture and heritage. The association has criticized Mr. Ahmadinejad’s comments about the Holocaust but has praised Mr. Fatthi’s show.

“Iran is home to some 25,000 Jews, the largest population in the Middle East outside of Israel. Iran’s Jews – along with Christians and Zoroastrians – are guaranteed equal rights in the country’s constitution. Iran’s Jews are guaranteed one member of parliament and are free to study Hebrew in school, pray in synagogues and shop at kosher supermarkets. Despite Mr. Ahmadinejad’s statements, it isn’t government policy to question the Holocaust, and the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, hasn’t endorsed those views.

“While Iran makes it no secret that it considers Israel an enemy, it has been extremely touchy about criticism of its treatment of Jewish citizens. The show is seen as an effort by the government to erase the image that it may be anti-Semitic – both at home among Jews and non-Jews, and abroad.

“‘In this show, you notice that a new method of political dialogue is being promoted that is more in line with the modern world,’ says Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a reformist cleric and former Iranian vice president.

“The message appears to be grabbing the public. Sara Khatibi, a 35-year-old mother and chemist in Tehran, says she and her husband never miss an episode. ‘All we ever hear about Jews is rants from the government about Israel,’ she says. ‘This is the first time we are seeing another side of the story and learning about their plight.’

“The show also pushes Iran’s political line regarding the legitimacy of Israel: The Jewish state was conceived in modern times by Western powers rather than as part of a centuries-old desire of Jews for a return to their ancestral homeland. In one scene, a rabbi declares it a bad idea for Jews to resettle in Arab lands. In another, the French Jewish protagonist refuses a marriage offer by a cousin, who is advocating the creation of Israel.

“Iran has long used TV to shape public opinion, where newspapers and the Internet are seen as media for the elite. The state’s control over radio and television is enshrined in the constitution. Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader, is not only head of the armed forces and the judiciary, but also the national broadcast authority.

“‘The regime appreciates the fact that to appeal to the masses, both in Iran and the Muslim world, television is the most important outlet,’ says Karim Sadjadpour, an expert on Iran at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

“On any given day, the country’s seven state-run channels broadcast a mostly drab offering of news, sports, cooking shows, soap operas and religious sermons. Political propaganda is constantly fed into the mix. Dissidents such as students or reformers are routinely paraded before cameras to read confessions after stints of solitary imprisonment.

“A slick documentary-style program recently aired long interviews with two Iranian-Americans who were detained on allegations of working to overthrow the regime. The interviews – in which the pair blandly admitted to meeting with Iranian scholars and dissidents, but not to attempting to topple the government – were intercut with provocative scenes of demonstrations in Ukraine, where the U.S. encouraged groups that eventually staged the successful Orange Revolution in late 2004.

“In July, Iran launched a 24-hour English-language satellite news channel called Press TV, joining the ranks of the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera. Its Arabic news channel, Al Alam, has been broadcasting news with an Iranian slant in the Arab world for several years.

“Episodes of Zero Degree Turn, broadcast in Farsi, can be seen outside of Iran on the Internet, either streaming live or downloaded at tv1.irib.ir. It is also broadcast with English subtitles on the state-controlled Jameh Jam satellite channel, which is available on Europe’s Hot Bird satellite network. Mr. Fatthi also says Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has been contacted about selling the show to networks in other countries, but he doesn’t know which ones.”

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There are clips from Zero Degree Turn on YouTube. … Or Does It Explode? links to a gallery of stills here “which seems to include a large number of female characters inexplicably covering their hair in 1940s Europe”.

What is Iranian in Shahab Hosseini’s face (top)? Inter alia, the eyebrows. Iranians have pronounced eyebrows, and a beyond-the-global-average genetic tendency towards the monobrow. The world was introduced to plunging Iranian eyebrows in January 1979.

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Italians in the Crusader states

October 12 2007

In the ephemeral overseas world (terre d’outre mer) which medieval Western Christendom won for itself in “the Crusades” at the expense of the moribund [Islamic] Syriac Society and the prematurely decadent Orthodox Christendom [Greece did not fall to an Islamic power until the fifteenth century], the feudal cosmos which the Crusaders created in this new colonial domain in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era actually was swallowed up, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, by the new city-state cosmos which had latterly come into being in Italy.

At the time of the original conquests, which were mainly achieved in the First Crusade and in the Fourth, the lion’s share of the conquered territories was parcelled out into feudal principalities, while the Italian maritime city-states, whose sea-power had contributed so much to the success of these joint Italian and Transalpine enterprises, had to content themselves with the acquisition of a number of comparatively small (though commercially and navally important) enclaves. By the end of the story, on the eve of the total extinction of Latin dominion in the Levant at the hands of the ’Osmanlis, the relative extent of the Italian and the Transalpine holdings of Latin territory in the Levant had been completely reversed. In so far as the ci-devant Frankish feudal principalities had not been reconquered by the Orthodox Christians and the Muslims, the remnants had been mostly preserved in virtue of their transfer from incompetent Transalpine to competent Italian hands. The change of régime which this transfer involved was striking; for, in the Frankish principalities overseas, the principles of feudalism had been carried to greater logical extremes, under artificial cultivation, than they had ever attained in their spontaneous growth on their native European soil, whereas the Italian colonial régimes which eventually took their place were anticipations of the modem Western methods of colonial exploitation.

The outstanding example of this process is the history of the Latin Kingdom of Cyprus, which was founded in A.D. 1191-2. As a result of a local conflict which broke out in A.D. 1372 between the Genoese and Venetian colonies in Cyprus, the reigning French dynasty of the House of Lusignan fell foul of the Genoese and was compelled to cede to the Genoese Republic the sovereignty over the port of Famagusta, with a monopoly of the foreign trade of the island. Famagusta was reconquered from the Genoese by the Cypriot Crown in A.D. 1464, but the enfeebled feudal power could only maintain itself by inviting a Venetian protectorate in A.D. 1466; and this protectorate duly led on, in the usual manner of protectorates, to annexation. In the last chapter of its history, from A.D. 1489 until the Ottoman Conquest in 1571, Latin Cyprus was a Venetian colony.

Another example is the Levantine career of the Acciajuoli – a family of Brescian steel-manufacturers who had settled in Florence and taken to banking. In A.D. 1334, Niccolò Acciajuoli, who was the confidential banker of the Angevin Court of Naples, took advantage of his financial and political transactions on behalf of his royal clients in order to acquire estates for himself in the Frankish feudal principality of Achaia. In 1358, Niccolò obtained from the ruling Angevin prince of Achaia the hereditary governorship of Corinth. Niccolò’s sons mortgaged Corinth to their second cousin Nerio Acciajuoli; and in 1385-8 Nerio conquered the Frankish Duchy of Athens (which included Boeotia as well as Attica) from the Catalans, who had conquered it themselves from the French in 1311. The Florentine dominion in Central Greece which was thus established in 1388 lasted until the Turkish annexation of Athens in 1456 and of Thebes in 1460.

A Study of History, Vol III, OUP, 1934 (footnote)

Saul, Jonathan and David

October 7 2007

See the short post on David.

In the thirteenth century BC, Moses led the Hebrew people out of Egypt, across the Sinai. He and his successor Joshua conquered the land of Canaan, the Promised Land, destroying the Canaanite cities of Ali, Jericho and Hazor.

The tribes of Israel during the period which followed were Reuben, Simeon, Levi, Judah, Dan, Naphtali, Gad, Asher, Issachar, Zebulun, Manasseh, Ephraim and Benjamin. In parts of the Bible, Ephraim and Manasseh are treated as together constituting the House of Joseph. The Levi had a special religious role and only scattered cities as territory. Either Ephraim and Manasseh were counted as one tribe or Levi was not counted, so that together there were Twelve Tribes.

The Philistines, a non-Semitic “Sea People”, came to Palestine, or the southern coast of Canaan (Palestine derives from Philistine), from the Aegean in the twelfth century BC, soon after the arrival of the Hebrews. They occupied the five cities of Gaza, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Ekron and Gath. They disappear from history after the Babylonian conquests of the sixth century BC.

The Hebrews were often subject to the Philistines and were ruled by Judges until c 1000 B.C. The prophet Samuel, florebat from c 1050 BC, was the last judge of Israel and the first of the prophets after Moses. His judgeship was dominated by war with the Philistines, who captured Moses’ Ark of the Covenant. In his old age he agreed, at divine request, to the establishment of a king; he thus anointed Saul and remained chief prophet during Saul’s reign. In this role he also anointed David, a shepherd, who was from the tribe of Judah.

Saul was succeeded by David and then by Solomon. After the expansionist reign of Solomon (c 970-928 BC), the kingdom broke up into two states: Israel, with its capital at Samaria (another city was Shechem), and Judah, under the house of David, with its capital at Jerusalem.

The two kingdoms were later conquered by expanding Mesopotamian states, Israel by Assyria (c 720 BC) and Judah by Babylonia (586 BC). The Babylonians destroyed the Temple at Jerusalem and held the Jews captive in Babylon.

In 539 BC the Persians conquered the Babylonians and in 538 allowed the Jews to return. The Temple was rebuilt (516 BC). Under Persian rule Palestine enjoyed considerable autonomy.

Alexander conquered Palestine in 333 BC. His successors contested for it. The attempt of the Seleucid Antiochus IV (Antiochus Epiphanes) to impose Hellenism brought a Jewish revolt under the Maccabees, who set up a new Jewish state in 142 BC.

Pompey conquered Palestine in 63 BC, but the state survived until 37 BC with a loss of autonomy. From 37 BC to AD 92 the Roman province of Judaea was ruled by puppet kings of the Romans, the Herodian Dynasty, a Jewish dynasty from Idumea.

When the Jews revolted in AD 66, the Romans destroyed the Temple (AD 70). Another revolt between AD 132 and 135 (led by Bar Kokhba) was also suppressed. Jericho and Bethlehem were destroyed, and the Jews were barred from Jerusalem.

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Here is Wikipedia’s summary of the story of David and Jonathan. It quotes from the King James Version, except at the end, where it gives the “surpassing” of the New King James Version. I’ve restored “passing” for the sake of consistency and corrected some of the punctuation.

“David, a handsome, ruddy-cheeked youth and the youngest son of Jesse, is brought before Saul, the king of Israel, having slain the giant Philistine warrior Goliath with only a stone and sling (1 Sam. 17:57).

“Jonathan, the eldest son of Saul, is struck with love for David on their first meeting. ‘And it came to pass, when he [David] [brackets in original] had made an end of speaking unto Saul, that the soul of Jonathan was knit with the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul.’ (1 Sam. 18:1). That same day, ‘Jonathan and David made a covenant, because he loved him as his own soul.’ (1 Sam. 18:3). Jonathan removes and offers David the rich garments he is wearing, and shares with him his worldly possessions. ‘And Jonathan stripped himself of the robe that was upon him, and gave it to David, and his garments, even to his sword, and to his bow, and to his girdle.’ (1 Sam. 18:4).

“The people of Israel openly accept David and sing his praises, so much so that it draws the jealousy of Saul (1 Sam. 18:5-9). Saul tries repeatedly to kill David, but is each time unsuccessful, and David’s reputation only grows with each attempt (1 Sam. 18:24-25). To get rid of David, Saul decides to offer him a daughter in marriage, requesting a hundred enemy foreskins in lieu of a dowry – hoping David will be killed trying. David however returns with a trophy of two hundred foreskins and Saul has to fulfill his end of the bargain.

“Learning of one of Saul’s murder attempts, Jonathan warns David to hide because he ‘delighted much in David’ (1 Sam. 19:1-2). David is forced to flee more of Saul’s attempts to kill him (1 Sam. 19:1-20:1). In a moment when they find themselves alone together, David says to Jonathan, ‘Thy father certainly knoweth that I have found grace in thine eyes [...]’ (1 Sam. 20:3).

“‘Then said Jonathan unto David, Whatsoever thy soul desireth, I will even do it for thee. … [and] Jonathan made a covenant with the house of David, saying, Let the LORD even require it at the hand of David’s enemies. And Jonathan caused David to swear again, because he loved him: for he loved him as he loved his own soul.’ (1 Sam. 20:4, Sam. 20:16-17).

“David agrees to hide, until Jonathan can confront his father and ascertain whether it is safe for David to stay (1 Sam. 20:18-22). Jonathan approaches his father to plead David’s cause: ‘Then Saul’s anger was kindled against Jonathan, and he said unto him, Thou son of the perverse rebellious woman, do not I know that thou hast chosen the son of Jesse to thine own confusion, and unto the confusion of thy mother’s nakedness?’ (1 Sam. 20:30).

“Jonathan is so grieved that he does not eat for days (1 Sam. 20:34). He goes to David at his hiding place to tell him that it is unsafe for him and he must leave. ‘David arose out of a place toward the south, and fell on his face to the ground, and bowed himself three times: and they kissed one another, and wept one with another, until David exceeded. And Jonathan said to David, Go in peace, forasmuch as we have sworn both of us in the name of the LORD, saying, The LORD be between me and thee, and between my seed and thy seed for ever. And he arose and departed: and Jonathan went into the city.’ (1 Sam. 20:41-42).

“Saul continues to pursue David (1 Sam. 21-23:14); David and Jonathan renew their covenant together (1 Sam. 23:15-18); and eventually Saul and David are reconciled (1 Sam. 24:16-22). When Jonathan is slain on Mt. Gilboa by the Philistines (1 Sam. 31:2), David laments his death saying, ‘I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan: very pleasant hast thou been unto me: thy love to me was wonderful, passing the love of women.’ (2 Sam. 1:26).”

Saul also dies at Mount Gilboa. The summary does not quote the phrase “How are the mighty fallen!” in relation to his and Jonathan’s deaths.

In the Goliath story, the Philistines, having amassed an army on a hillside opposite the Israelite forces, suggest that it would be better, to save effort and lives on both sides, to have a proxy combat between their champion from Gath, named Goliath, and someone of Saul’s choosing. David, a shepherd, is delivering food to his three older brothers, who are in the Israelite army, at the time the challenge is made. Talking to soldiers, he mocks the Philistines, and is told off by his brothers for doing so. His speech is reported to Saul, who does not know David, but summons him, and appoints him his champion in the duel.

David was a musician, and by tradition the author of the Psalms. Another story tells us that while David was playing the harp in front of the troubled Saul, Saul threw a spear at him, but missed.

During David’s period in the wilderness, and before his reconciliation with Saul, he made an alliance with the Philistines (Achish of Gath), which emboldened them to attack Israel. When Saul is told by Samuel’s ghost that he will be killed in the battle of Mount Gilboa, he either kills himself or is killed at his request by an Amalekite after his own armour bearer refuses. The Amalekites were aboriginal people of Canaan and the Sinai peninsula. They waged constant warfare against the Hebrews until dispersed by Saul.

In Islam David is called Dawood. The Psalms are the Zabur. Muslims reject the portrayal of David (in his association with Uriah) as adulterer and murderer.

What are the dynamics of the Saul-Jonathan-David triangle? What was Samuel’s role? Was Saul a Claggart to David’s Billy Budd? What does “until David exceeded” mean? Was David implicated in Saul’s death?

The formal post-Solomonic split into Israel and Judah came out of an existing division. David’s relationship with Jonathan is seen by some as a representation of two nations, Saul representing Israel, David Judah. Jonathan may represent the Hebrews, whom the Book of Samuel appears to treat as distinct from Israel and Judah. Jonathan’s association with David would then reflect an alliance between the Hebrews and Judah, which became more important than the alliance between the Hebrews and Israel.The Hebrews are also identified with David’s band of pro-Philistine outlaws after his rift with Saul. The narrative of David’s flight and subsequent reconciliation with Saul becomes one of a rebellion by Judah with Philistine support, which became an uneasy truce.

Some Biblical “minimalists” have claimed that the “United Kingdom” was merely an invention intended to back up the subsequent claims of Judah to Israel.

The capital of David’s Judah had been Hebron. Saul’s United Kingdom had had capitals at Gibeah and Shiloh. Saul’s successor Ish-boseth had a capital at Mahanaim.

After the deaths of Saul and Jonathan, David, thirty years old, goes up to Hebron, where he is anointed King of Judah. In the north, Saul’s son Ish-boseth succeeds him in Israel, but David eventually triumphs. He conquers a fortress, Jerusalem, which had belonged to a Canaanite tribe called the Jebusites, and makes it his capital. He overcomes weaker states such as Philisia, Moab, Edom and Ammon. The Aramean city-states of Aram-Zobah and Aram-Damascus become vassals.

The Phoenician king of Tyre, to the north, Hiram, pays him homage and sends carpenters and masons, bringing cedar wood, to build David a house. David brings the Ark of the Covenant to Jerusalem, intending to build a temple. God, speaking to the prophet Nathan, forbids it, saying that the temple must wait for a future generation. But God makes a covenant with David, promising that he will establish the house of David eternally.

David lies with Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, and Bathsheba becomes pregnant. David causes Uriah to die on the battlefield in order to cover up his adultery. Nathan condemns him. Bathsheba’s child dies, but David’s second son by Bathsheba was his son Solomon.

David (who had eight wives) deals with a rebellion by his son Absalom. David reigned “seven years in Hebron and thirty-three years in Jerusalem”. He died in his bed at the age of seventy.

When the “eternal” Davidic dynasty failed after four centuries, it formed the basis for the Jewish belief in the Messiah.

Generations of scholars have tried to understand the traditions embodied in often self-contradictory Biblical passages, the layers of propaganda in the original texts and the implications of different translations. Archaeology often upsets even their most tentative conclusions.

David’s withdrawal and return

October 3 2007

Caesar

Another example of the motif of withdrawal followed by creative return. David, c 1000 BC, is the second king of a united Israel.

David begins his career as a mighty man of valour in Saul’s war-band. In other words, the future hero first appears on the scene as just an outstanding representative of what is, in itself, a common type in the society into which has been born. It is not until Saul’s jealousy has driven David into the wilderness, to lead the precarious life of an outlaw in the no-man’s-land between Israel and Philistia, that David begins to acquire the statesmanship which eventually marks him out to be Saul’s successor. And it is this statesmanship, thus acquired, that enables David, after his return from the wilderness, to solve for Israel the urgent problem of endowing the people of the hill-country [the Israelites] with a political organization that will enable them to hold their own against the people of the coast [the Philistines].

A Study of History, Vol III, OUP, 1934

Before the deluge

September 28 2007

Another, rather bleak, post in this grown-up blog from Oman.

Or read his views on Amis. Or Fisk.

And, apropos nothing except one of my interests, some grown-up German journalism about Hans Werner Henze after the premiere of Phaedra. A moving article, if you know the characters.

I love the telegraph wires as an “airy stave”. Henze cannot open his mouth without saying something entrancing.

Colonialism: The view from 1969

September 23 2007

I am old enough to remember vividly the celebration of Queen Victoria’s diamond jubilee in 1897 and [...] it can now be seen, in retrospect, that this was really a celebration of the zenith of the British Empire. The British was merely the largest and most potent of the empires possessed at that date by a number of West European states: Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Italy. In 1897 these six West European countries, between them, were dominant, in some degree, over almost all the rest of the World. The extent of their empires at that date is not fully revealed by the colours on the political map of the World in 1897, vast though this map shows Western Europe’s non-European political possessions, dependencies, and protectorates to have been at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A number of countries – some of them large countries – that figure on the map at that date as being politically independent were economically dependent on Western Europe, and economic dependence, when it becomes extreme, makes nominal political independence unreal. In 1897, Western Europe’s economic empire – invisible on the political map but palpable for its subjects – included the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Turkish Empire, Iran, the Chinese Empire, and all the Latin American republics.

In 1897 the United States itself was Western Europe’s debtor. She had financed the development of her vast virgin western territories by borrowing West European capital. The tables were not turned till, in the First World War, the West European powers played among themselves a suicidal game of beggar-my-European-neighbour. In 1897 Western Europe had still seventeen years of financial dominance ahead of her before she started, in the First World War, to bring on herself the ruin that she consummated in the Second World War. The tables were turned indeed when, after the Second World War, Europe owed her economic rehabilitation to the Marshall Plan, under which American aid was given as a free gift, in contrast to the business terms on which the economic development of the United States had been financed by Western Europe in the nineteenth century.

The United States’ indebtedness to Europe, heavy though this was at its peak, did not, of course, undermine the United States’ political independence at any stage. Apart from the United States, however, completely independent states were rare, outside Europe, in 1897. In Asia there were, by that time, only two, namely Japan and Thailand, and in Africa there was only one, Ethiopia, after the annexation of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal to the British Empire in the South African War. Liberia, though nominally independent, was virtually a protectorate of the United States. Ethiopia – a natural fortress garrisoned by a martial people, the Amharas – had not only maintained her independence but had competed successfully with the West European powers in “the scramble for Africa”. On the other hand, Egypt, which had started the scramble by conquering the Sudan in 1820, had not only lost her Nilotic empire to the followers of the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad; she had herself fallen under British domination in 1882. Tunisia had fallen under French domination in 1881. Morocco was to be entered by the French army in 1905 and to become a French protectorate in 1911, and Libya was to be conquered by Italy from the Ottoman Empire in and after the latter year.

The political map of Africa in 1969, when set side by side with the map of Africa as it had been in 1897, gives the measure of the extent of the de-colonization of Africa, and of the rest of the former non-European dependencies of Western Europe, during the interval. The whole process of de-colonization has actually taken place during and since the Second World War, beginning with the liquidation, during this war, of Italy’s short-lived rule over Ethiopia [1941] and culminating in Africa in France’s withdrawal from Algeria [1962]. [Perhaps Iraq’s “independence” in 1932 is an earlier example.] In 1968 the only surviving West European colonial empire in Africa was the oldest of them all, namely the Portuguese; and Portugal was still able to hold Angola and Mozambique only because she was being supported by one African country, South Africa, that was independent de jure and by another, Rhodesia, that, thanks to South Africa’s and Portugal’s support and Rhodesia’s juridical sovereign Britain’s weakness, was independent de facto.

Though the de-colonization movement had been started during the Second World War by the restoration of Ethiopia’s independence, it was given its decisive impetus in 1947, when Britain – completing the execution of a pledge that she had given in 1917 and had been implementing progressively since then – relinquished her sovereignty over the former British Indian Empire and over Ceylon. (The liberated British Indian Empire immediately split into three separate independent states: the Indian Union, Pakistan, and Burma.) The Asian territories from which Britain withdrew in 1947 constituted so large and so important a part of Western Europe’s aggregate non-European dominions that it made the liberation of the rest of these inevitable, and this in the near future.

The motives that moved the European ex-colonial powers to renounce their empires were mixed. Undoubtedly one motive was a moral one that was both genuine and disinterested. Important sections of public opinion in the West European countries that possessed colonial empires had come to feel that it was wrong for them to withhold from their non-European subjects the political independence that they claimed for themselves – and this not as a God-given European privilege but as a basic human right. There was also another motive that was not idealistic but was prudential, yet was not discreditable on that account.

By 1945 – the date of the end of the Second World War – subject peoples all over the World were making insistent demands for national independence in the name of the principles of nationalism and democracy which they had learnt from their involuntary contact with their European rulers. These demands would have been made, and have been prosecuted in the last resort by violence, in any event; but the inevitable course of events had been speeded up by the effect of the two world wars – particularly by Japan’s exploits in the Second World War, when she had bombed the United States fleet in Pearl Harbor and had temporarily overrun and occupied all American, British, French, and Dutch colonial possessions in Eastern Asia as far west as Malaya and Indonesia and Burma inclusive. These Japanese conquests had been ephemeral. The Second World War had ended in Japan herself having to capitulate and to submit, for the first time in her history, to being occupied militarily by a foreign power. Yet historically Japan’s sensational opening victories have had more effect than her eventual defeat.

Japan has made history – irreversible history – by demonstating that the West is not invincible. In 1941 Japan called the Western powers’ bluff. The reputation for invincibility that Britain had won at Plassey in 1757 and France at Imbabah [Egypt] in 1798 had enabled the West European powers, for the best part of two centuries, to conquer and hold vast non-European territories with small forces at slight cost. The West European empire-builders’ victims had been psychologically defeated before they had joined battle physically with their West European assailants. Now that Japan had called the West’s bluff, it was evident that the already rising tide of Asian and African anticolonialism was going to prove irresistible. After 1945 its irresistibility was demonstrated by French experience in Indo-china (sic) and Algeria and by British experience in Cyprus and South Arabia. After having exhausted themselves by the cumulative tribulation of two world wars, the European ex-colonial powers had neither the will nor the strength to hold by sheer force the empires that they had previously held mainly by prestige. The prudential reason for the West European powers’ renunciation of their colonial empires was that they had come to the rational conclusion that the game of colonialism was no longer worth the candle.

For a brief moment it looked as if the end of European colonialism were going to be the end of colonialism itself; but, since the close of the Second World War, the Americans and Israelis have rushed in where West Europeans now fear to tread. Britain’s renunciation, in 1948, of her mandate for the administration of Palestine was followed instantaneously by the proclamation of the establishment
of the State of Israel on Palestinian Arab territory. The recession of the French wave of colonialism in Vietnam was followed promptly by the onset of an American wave, and the United States’ war in Vietnam, like her previous war in Korea, has been part of an attempt to build an American colonial empire in Eastern Asia extending from Japan through South Korea and Taiwan and South Vietnam to Thailand, and also including Australia and New Zealand, which, in the pertinent geographical sense, are East Asian countries.

In its present first stage this American colonial empire in Eastern Asia has taken the form of an American protectorate over states that remain nominally independent but have actually become the United States’ satellites. This had been the first stage in the building of the now defunct European colonial empires; so it is familiar to both the European ex-imperial peoples themselves and to their former Asian and African subjects. In the eyes of a majority of mankind, the United States in 1968 was in the act of trying, in her turn, to build up a colonial empire of the traditional kind. This foreign view of what the United States was trying to do was also held by a minority of the American public which was protesting against what their government was doing in their name. We may guess that the same view was held tacitly by some men in the Pentagon at Washington, D.C., who might be consciously and deliberately aiming at the objective that was attributed to the United States by the American dissenting minority and by the non-American world.

On the other hand, this charge was repudiated by most Americans sincerely and therefore indignantly. In this majority’s eyes the Americans were not committing in 1968 the offence of empire-building which, in the past, they had justly condemned when it was being committed by their European fellow Westerners. The Americans believed themselves to be defending “the Free World” (i.e. all countries living under non-Communist régimes of whatever kind) against “World Communism”. In 1968 many Americans still believed, bona fide, that this monster exists and that its objective is nothing less than the conquest of the whole World. Non-American observers, on the other hand, are aware that the countries under Communist régimes are no more united among themselves than countries under other régimes are. Indeed, the quarrel between Communist Continental China and the Communist Soviet Union has been carried to extreme lengths, and the Soviet Union has retorted to liberalization in Czechoslovakia by military occupation.

The Americans see themselves waging a crusade, in the mediaeval Western meaning of the word, on behalf of World-Capitalist- Democracy against World-Communist-Tyranny. The Americans are right in thinking that the Capitalist and Communist post-Christian ideologies are religions, and these of the missionary kind, of which Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam are older representatives. President Wilson declared that the United States had intervened in the First World War “to make the World safe for Democracy”; Trotsky, if he had been the victor in his contest with Stalin, would have expended the resources of the Soviet Union to make the World safe for Communism. The misapprehension that the Americans share with the Trotskyites is their mistaken common assumption that Capitalism and Communism are the principal – or even the sole – post-Christian ideologies that are in the running. In reality the principal heir of Christianity and of all the other historic higher religions is, in 1969, not either of the two missionary ideologies; it is Nationalism. This is a potent religion partly because it is as old as mankind itself, and partly because, in the post-Christian Western World, the fanaticism that Christianity has inherited from Judaism has been decanted into Nationalism. The recent prestige of the West has moved the non-Western peoples to adopt this most powerful and most vicious of the three post-Christian Western ideologies. In 1969, Nationalism is about ninety per cent of the religion of about ninety per cent of the whole human race. Trotsky’s defeat by Stalin is highly significant. In every country, whether Communist or Capitalist, in which the locally established ecumenical ideology has clashed with the country’s particular national interests, these national interests have invariably been given precedence, and Communism or Capitalism – whichever it may happen to have been – has gone to the wall.

As I see it, the Americans have mistaken the identity of the adversary whom they have challenged in Vietnam. Their opponent there has been, not the mythical monster “World Communism”, but Vietnamese Nationalism. The military might of the United States was being frustrated in Vietnam in 1968 because Nationalism is a cause for which present-day human beings are willing to sacrifice their lives. The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have been fighting, primarily, not to extend the domain of Communism, but to drive a foreign invader out of their country. The Soviet Union and Continental China have been giving North Vietnam and the Vietcong resistance-movement the tools to do the job, not for the idealistic reason that they are all fellow Communists, but for the practical reason that moved the United States to give the tools to Britain in 1940. The United States believed in 1940 that her own national security would be menaced by Germany if she were to allow Germany to conquer Britain. I have noted already that the Soviet Union and China, whose views of their respective national interests clash in 1969 over most issues, have been of one mind in holding that the national security of both powers would be menaced by the United States if they were to allow the United States to conquer and hold Vietnam.

In November 1968, one thing was already certain. Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam might be, the Vietnamese resistance-movement had already made history. A small “developing” country had dared to defy the might of the strongest military power that has existed so far. The Vietnamese people had stood the ordeal of being tormented with “conventional” weapons of unprecedented potency and atrociousness. They had prevented the invader from conquering more than a minor part of their country, and their spirit had not been broken by enemy Schrecklichkeit – though this had been “escalated” to a degree that put most previous performances in this line in the shade. Meanwhile, the heroism of the Vietnamese resistance had put a strain on the United States’ economic resources that had shaken the World’s confidence in the dollar. It is just conceivable that, by the time when the present book appears, the Vietnamese people will have been exterminated and Vietnam will have been made uninhabitable. The Vietnamese might suffer the fate that the Romans inflicted on the Palestinian Jewish resistance-movement in A.D. 66-70 and in A.D. 132-5. Yet in that event the Vietnamese would play the posthumous role that was played by the three hundred Spartans who were exterminated at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. They would inspire other non-Western peoples to face death and devastation rather than submit to the re-imposition on them of colonial rule by any Western power.

In any event the price for the United States of military victory in Vietnam would be likely to be the devaluation of the dollar, the human sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of American young men, and the moral condemnation of the United States by the rest of the World – a condemnation as severe and as universal as the condemnation incurred by Germany under the Nazi régime, by Japan during the years 1931-45, and by the Soviet Union under Stalin’s rule. I shall be surprised if the American people carries its intervention in Vietnam to these lengths, but [...] I do not find this possibility absolutely inconceivable.

Meanwhile, the Vietnam war’s course has already vindicated both the wisdom and the virtue of the West European ex-imperial powers’ renunciation of their former colonial empires. At the same time, the American people’s failure to learn this lesson by salutary example is a sad illustration of human nature’s recalcitrance to learning by anything short of bitter direct experience.

In November 1968 the outcome of the war in the Middle East was as unpredictable as the outcome of the war in Vietnam. In each of the three Arab-Israeli wars that had been waged so far, the Israelis had won victories whose speed and professional brilliance the men in the Pentagon at Washington, D.C., must envy. Yet, on a long view, the Israelis’ military and political prospects in the Middle East were still less promising than the Americans’ prospects in Eastern Asia. In 1968 the Israelis were being baffled by the same spiritual and same geographical problem that were baffling the United States. The Arabs, like the Vietnamese, were determined not to submit to being resubjected to colonial rule, and geography was in their favour. [...] The Arab World is as extensive as Vietnam and Continental China taken together, whereas Israel’s man-power is puny by comparison not only with the United States’ but with North Vietnam’s.

As elsewhere, Toynbee places too much faith in Arab solidarity.

Moreover, the Palestinian Arabs, and also all other Arab peoples within Israel’s reach, had a still greater incentive to resist than the Vietnamese had. While it was possible for the Americans to exterminate the Vietnamese, it was decidedly improbable that they would carry their Schrecklichkeit to this length. The worst that they were likely to try to do in Vietnam was to conquer the whole country and hold it down under military occupation; and, so long as a subject people survives physically, it can look forward to recovering its political independence eventually. The Vietnamese, if not exterminated, could look forward to this, because it was certain that the Americans had no intention of evicting them and replacing them by American settlers. For natives of the temperate zone the climate of Vietnam is uninviting, and the Americans have ample living-space within the United States, with a wide range of tolerable climates to choose from in different sections of this huge country.

However, the Americans had won this living-space for themselves by doing to the previous inhabitants what they were almost certainly not going to do to the Vietnamese. In what is now the United States the American settlers got rid of the Amerindian natives partly by exterminating them and partly by evicting them from all desirable land and corralling them in “reservations”. In South Africa, Rhodesia, and Kenya, too, the African natives have been evicted by the dominant European settlers of Dutch and British origin from most land that is suitable for habitation and cultivation by incomers of European origin, and this act of robbery in these three countries has so far been reversed only in Kenya, because it is only in Kenya, so far, that political power has passed out of the “white” minority’s hands into the African majority’s. I do not know whether the French settlers in North-West Africa acquired any of their land by evicting the Berber and Arab inhabitants. Some, at any rate, of these French settlers performed a valuable service for the countries in which they settled by bringing back into cultivation marginal lands, cultivated previously in Roman times, which had subsequently become derelict. The moral wrong and economic calamity that has been inflicted on African populations in South Africa, Rhodesia, and temporarily in Kenya by West European settlers has been inflicted by East European settlers, the Zionist Jews, on the Palestinian Arabs. A majority of these Arabs whose homes lie on the Israeli side of the 1949 armistice-lines have been evicted and robbed. In 1968 the Arab inhabitants of the territory between the 1949 and the 1967 armistice-lines were in danger of suffering the same outrageous ill-treatment.

Israeli colonialism since the establishment of the state of Israel is one of the two blackest cases in the whole history of colonialism in the modern age; and its blackness is thrown into relief by its date. The East European Zionists have been practising colonialism in Palestine in the extreme form of evicting and robbing the native Arab inhabitants at the very time when the West European peoples have been renouncing their temporary rule over non-European peoples. The other outstanding black case is the eviction of five agricultural Amerindian peoples – the Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creeks, Cherokees, and Seminoles – from their ancestral homes in what are now the states of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee to “reservations” in what is now the state of Oklahoma. This eviction was started in 1820 and was completed for the most part by 1838. But the Cherokees were recalcitrant and the Seminoles resisted by force of arms. They withdrew into the swamps of Southern Florida, and their resistance there was overcome by the United States Army only in the course of the eighteen-forties. This nineteenth-century American colonialism was a crime; the Israeli colonialism, which was being carried on at the time when I was writing, was a crime that was also a moral anachronism.

The frontier spirit

US riverboat deploying ignited napalm in Vietnam

Experiences, OUP, 1969

Resuscitated languages

September 12 2007

The resuscitated Hebrew, Norwegian, and Irish languages are virtually artificial products. Each of them has had to invent a large new vocabulary for conveying modern ideas and for describing modern things. The incentive in each case has been national feeling, and in the Jewish case this has been reinforced by religious feeling, since, for Jews [he should have said for some Jews], nationality and religion are inseparable. Thus the incentive for reviving Hebrew has been stronger than the incentive for reviving Norwegian and Irish, and it is no accident that, of the three revivals, the revival of Hebrew has been by far the most successful. In Israel, Hebrew has become a genuine national language, in spite of the existence of Yiddish, which had produced a notable literature and had won a considerable emotional attachment.

Surviving the Future, OUP, 1971

Seepage into Arabia

September 9 2007

arabia.jpg

Since the domestication of the Arabian camel, nearly 2,000 years before Muhammad’s day, Arabia had been traversible, and ideas and institutions had been seeping into the peninsula from the Fertile Crescent that adjoins it on the north. The effect of this infiltration had been cumulative, and, by Muhammad’s time, the accumulated charge of spiritual force in Arabia was ready to explode. Yet it might not have found vent if Muhammad had not arisen to direct it. Conversely, if Muhammad had been born before the time had become ripe in Arabia, even his vision, determination, and sagacity might have been defeated.

[...]

A trinity of goddesses that had been worshipped in the second and third centuries A.D. at Hatra in north-eastern Mesopotamia and in the oasis of Palmyra, at the northern extremity of the Arabian desert, had also found its way into the Hejaz (the north-west Arabian highlands).

The Hejaz includes Mecca and Medina.

Judaism, perhaps first introduced by refugees from the Romano-Jewish wars of A.D. 66-70 and 132-5, had won converts in the Hejaz in the oases of Tayma’, Khaybar, and Yathrib (Medina, “the city” of the Prophet Muhammad) and also in the Yemen. Christianity had also won converts in the Yemen. In the sixth century A.D. the Yemen had [...] been drawn into the commercial and political competition between the East Roman and the Persian Empire. From some date before 523 and again from c. 528 to c. 571 the Yemen was under the rule of the Kingdom of Aksum, which was Christian and was consequently the East Roman Empire’s satellite; from c. 571 to 630 the Yemen was under Persian rule. At some date in the third quarter of the sixth century an Aksumite viceroy of the Yemen tried to march on Mecca.

Aksum had emerged as a power in the first century and lasted for about a thousand years. It was never conquered by Moslems. Toynbee writes of it in an earlier passage in the same book:

The Kingdom of Aksum, in the northern part of present-day Ethiopia, had been converted to Christianity about half way through the fourth century. In the sixth century, Aksum, like Nubia, adopted Monophysitism, and the East Roman Imperial Government had to acquiesce. Aksum commanded the sea-route between Egypt and India, and its ruler was in a position to intervene in the Yemen in the Roman Empire’s interest. Constantinople could not afford politically to quarrel with Aksum over a theological issue.

Muhammad lived at a time when the two superpowers to the north were at war.

Muhammad’s lifetime, c. 570-632, covered the time-span of the two last and most exhausting of the Romano-Persian Wars, waged in 572-91 and 604-28 [the last confrontations between Persia and the Mediterranean classical world]. Each empire had already enlisted Arabs to serve as wardens of its marches confronting the rival empire. The capital of the Persian Empire’s Arab march was Hirah, near the future site of the Muslim Arab cantonment at Kufah.

The rulers of Hirah were the Lakhmids, Arab Christians.

The Ghassanid Arab dynasty [also Christian] guarded the East Roman Empire’s marches in Syria. In the Romano-Persian wars, Arabs served both belligerents as mercenaries. These gained not only pay, but also military training and experience, and they spent part of their pay on equipment – for instance, on buying cuirasses and on breeding war-horses. The excellent Arab breed was a tour de force; in Arabia it was, and is, a parasite on the domesticated camel; beyond the bounds of Arabia after Muhammad’s death, the Arab horse carried Arab conquerors to the Loire and the Volga and the Jaxartes.

Is he implying that the Lakhmids and Ghassanids facilitated the Muslim conquests (which swept them away, too) by selling weapons and horses to other Arabs?

Thus, by Muhammad’s time, the civilizations of the Levant and Iran were closing in on Mecca from all directions, and Muhammad himself went out to meet the civilization of the East Roman Empire. When the Arabs were not serving the East Romans and the Persians as mercenary soldiers, they did business with them as traders. Muhammad himself conducted caravans from Mecca to Damascus and back as the employee of his future wife, Khadijah. The most probable dates of his journeys [into Roman territory] are the peace-years between 591 and 604. After the Persian Emperor Khusro II had started to invade and occupy successively Mesopotamia and Syria and Palestine and Egypt, Meccan trade with the East Roman Empire must have become precarious. The date of Muhammad’s first experience of receiving a message from God is c. 610. By then he was married to Khadijah and was a householder in Mecca.

[...]

Muhammad’s religious experience took the form of epiphanies of the Archangel Gabriel. He comes out of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. He began to preach. He was opposed by the merchant-oligarchs who governed Mecca, the Banu Quraysh, who feared that their own sanctuary, the Ka’bah, on which the prestige of Mecca as a centre of trade on the route between Yemen and Syria depended, and which housed a pantheon (including the trinity of goddesses mentioned earlier), would be put out of business if monotheism were to prevail.

Then, in 622, Muhammad was invited to Yathrib or Medina, to become its ruler. From there he made war on Mecca and looted its caravans. In 630 Mecca capitulated. He gave his Qurayshite tribesmen lenient terms and made the fortune of the Ka’bah and the pilgrimage by incorporating them into the institutions of Islam.

By 632, the year of his death, his government’s sovereignty was acknowledged throughout Arabia, up to the southern bounds of the pasturelands of those Arab tribes that paid allegiance to either the East Roman or the Persian Empire. One of the conditions of political submission to Muhammad’s state was conversion to Islam, but this was in most cases perfunctory – not least in Mecca. Muhammad’s wars between 622 and 632 were minute compared to the contemporaneous Romano-Persian war of 604-628, but the combined effect of the great war in the north and the little wars in Arabia was immense in the sequel.

His sympathy for Islam and its teachings is qualified by his account of Muhammad’s later career.

The provision of opportunities for winning loot was one of the means by which Muhammad kept his heterogeneous body politic united and loyal. The Meccans were the first victims of the Muslim community’s appetite for loot; the spoliation of the Jewish clans at Yathrib, and later of the Khaybar Jews as well, was still more lucrative.

Muhammad knew that the Jews and the Christians were “People of the Book”, i.e. that they had scriptures containing information and commandments which, so they believed and as Muhammad took on trust from them, were revelations made by God. Muhammad believed that the Koran which was being dictated to him was God’s latest revelation – a definitive revelation addressed particularly to the Arabs, and therefore in Arabic. Since monotheism was the fundamental truth revealed in the Koran, as well as in the Jewish scriptures and the Gospel, it was reasonable for Muhammad to expect to receive the sympathy and support of those Arab clans at Yathrib that had embraced Judaism. Muhammad was being naive, however, if he expected the Jews of Yathrib to abandon their Judaism for Islam on the ground that the Koran was the book in which God was giving his (sic) revelation to Arabic-speakers. Muhammad cannot have been unaware that the Jews had persistently declined to abandon Judaism for Christianity.

The Yathribite Jews did not respond, as the Yathribite pagans did, to Muhammad’s call to them to become Muslims, but the Jews were needlessly and tactlessly reckless. They pointed out that the Koran made a number of mistakes in its references to information given in the Torah. These mistakes were gross but they were innocuous, and, for Muhammad, the rebuff was wounding and damaging. His retort was savage, out of all proportion to the measure of the Jews’ offence, and it was also unprincipled. The Yathribite Jews were a minority and they were rich. Muhammad gave the Muslim majority of the Yathribite community a free hand to despoil the Yathribite Jews and to evict them. The last batch of Muhammad’s Yathribite victims were not even allowed to depart beggared but in peace. They were not only robbed; the men were massacred and the women and children were enslaved.

Thus robbery, war, and massacre were among the means by which Muhammad won his victory for Islam. The same crimes have been committed by Christians and, less frequently, also by Buddhists, and in the Jewish scriptures they are attributed to Moses and to Joshua. But at least the founders of Buddhism and Christianity did not set their followers these bad examples.

Islam had not left the Arabian peninsula when Muhammad died.

Advice on Muhammad

The Arab conquests

Mankind and Mother Earth, OUP, 1976, posthumous

The Fertile Crescent

September 8 2007

fertile-crescent.png

Wikimedia Commons

… Or Does It Explode?

August 28 2007

Time to flag this useful, if politically rather straightforward, Middle East blog.

After-comment, September 30: Too straightforward. And no coverage at all of Israel or the Palestinians.

Toynbee, Turkey and Armenia 5

June 10 2007

Toynbee, Turkey and Armenia 1

Toynbee, Turkey and Armenia 2

Toynbee, Turkey and Armenia 3

Toynbee, Turkey and Armenia 4

In his late book Acquaintances, Toynbee tells us that the “request” of His Majesty’s Government to Lord Bryce for the Blue Book on the Armenian massacres was part of a more complicated propaganda initiative than is immediately obvious.

Lord Bryce [who had already presented evidence in speeches] had agreed on condition that H.M.G. would provide him with an amanuensis. I had been given the job.

At the time, I was unaware of the politics that lay behind this move of H.M.G.’s, and I believe Lord Bryce was as innocent as I was. Perhaps this was fortunate. For, if our eyes had been opened, I hardly think that either Lord Bryce or I would have been able to do the job that H.M.G. had assigned to us in the complete good faith in which we did, in fact, carry it out. Lord Bryce’s concern, and mine, was to establish the facts and make them public, in the hope that eventually some action might be taken in the light of them. The dead – and the deportees had been dying in their thousands – could not be brought back to life, but we hoped (vain hope) that at least something might be done to ensure, for the survivors, that there should never be a repetition of the barbarities that had been the death of so many of their kinsmen.

McNeill, Toynbee’s biographer, writes:

“British propagandists decided that efforts to publicize Armenian sufferings would help to counteract German news reports from the eastern front describing Russian atrocities against the Jews in Poland. The United States was the main target, for the British calculated that they needed to offset the widespread sympathy for Germany among American Jews, who were well aware of Russian pogroms and other manifestations of anti-Semitism. By blaming the Germans for tolerating worse atrocities in Armenia than anything happening in Poland, the Allied cause might be served, at whatever cost to the truth about German responsibility for Turkish actions.”

American Jews were appalled by the actions of the Russian army. Russia was Britain’s ally. Therefore American Jews might sympathise with Russia’s enemy Germany and influence American opinion against the Allies.

After the Blue Book had been published, I gradually became aware of the politics that had lain behind H.M.G.’s request to Lord Bryce. The date was 1915. In the spring of that year, the Germans had made that colossal breakthrough on the eastern front [...]. As the Russian armies had retreated across the Jewish Pale, they had committed atrocities against the Jewish diaspora, and, when the pursuing German armies had occupied the evacuated Russian territories, they had cashed in on the Russians’ indiscretion. (The Russian barbarities were also that. From the point of view of public relations, “they were worse than a crime; they were a blunder”.) At that time, the Pale (i.e. the ex-Polono-Lithuanian dominions of the Russian Empire) was still the centre of gravity of World-Jewry. For the Jews, the Pale was then what the North-Eastern United States is now. Yet, by 1915, the naturalized ex-East-European Jewish community in the United States was already numerous and prosperous enough to be a power in American life [...].

The Germans made a propaganda exercise out of Russia’s “indiscretion”.

At the very time when the Russians had been committing barbarities against their Jews, the Turks had been committing considerably worse barbarities against their Armenians. If Russian barbarities were telling against Britain and France, would not Turkish barbarities tell against Germany and Austria-Hungary? This line of reasoning in Whitehall lay behind H.M.G.’s application to Lord Bryce to produce a Blue Book on what the Turks had been doing to the Armenians.

H.M.G.’s counter-move to the German General Staff’s move indicates that, by 1915, Whitehall was just beginning to become Madison-Avenue-minded. [...]

Toynbee goes on to point out the very obvious weaknesses in the counter-move. American Jews would not feel the same sympathy with Armenians that they had felt with their kinsmen of the Pale, and the Armenian diaspora was not large or influential enough to be a counter-influence.

Then he makes a connection which I assume is provable through original sources: a connection between that propaganda failure and British support of Zionism.

Disillusioned by the failure of their first [clumsy] essay in propaganda, H.M.G. thought again; and at last they took the obvious point that, in order to solve their Jewish problem, they must find a solution in Jewish, not in Armenian, terms. The negative effect on Jewish feelings of the bad thing that the Russians had done to the Jews could be counteracted, if at all, only by some positive act, on the Western Allies’ part, to the Jews’ advantage; and this good thing that the Western Allies would have to do for the Jews must be of a magnitude that would outweigh the Russian barbarities decisively. Zionism was the key. The Western powers must make themselves agents for the fulfilment of the Zionists’ aspirations. Here was something that might swing Jewish sympathies over to the Allies’ side – at any rate in the United States, and perhaps also in Central Europe, though, ironically, Zionism had little appeal for the Jews of Britain and France.

When H.M.G. noticed this trump card in their hand, they were, of course, eager to play it; but first they would have to surmount two obstacles. Palestine was not yet in their possession for them to deliver to Zionism, and there was a Russian veto on any project for making Palestine Jewish. (The Russian Imperial Government’s position was that a Jewish Palestine would no longer be a Holy Land fit for being trodden by Russian [ie Christian] pilgrims.) The first obstacle fell when Allenby entered Jerusalem; the second fell with the fall of Tsardom. The promulgation of the Balfour Declaration followed.

He uses the word promulgation deliberately. The date of the Declaration was November 2. The date of the October revolution was November 7-8 (“October” comes from the Julian calendar; Russia adopted the Gregorian calendar in 1918). Allenby did not enter Jerusalem until December 9.

Acquaintances, OUP, 1967